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TEACHING THE THEORIES OF 
EVOLUTION AND SCIENTIFIC 
CREATIONISM IN THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS: THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 
AND PERMISSIBLE RELIEF 
Traditional methods of religious training and transmission of 
moral values have been irreversibly altered by the changing role 
of the family, the church, and the public school.1 The expanding 
role of the public school in this training triggers concern that 
these traditional moral and religious values are being displaced.1 
As a result, the appropriate role of religion in the public schools 
has become the subject of ongoing, heated debate. 3 Religiously 
motivated parents, fearful that their children's religious beliefs 
are undermined by morally "neutral" public school education, 
have persuaded school officials to import prayer,• Bible study,0 
and the Ten Commandments6 into some public classrooms. The 
Supreme Court has struck down each of these attempts as an 
impermissible mix of church and state.7 
A related controversy concerns the appropriateness of teach-
1. See, e.g., Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: ls There a Right 
to Have One's Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 
882 (1977)(schools have taken on the task of character development, teaching a variety 
of virtues such as honesty and hard work). 
2. See id. at 873 (noting parental fears that public schools were undermining parental 
values); Recent Developments, The Constitutionality Under the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment of Compulsory Sex Education in Public Schools, 68 MICH. L. REV. 
1050, 1050-52 (1970)(noting similar concerns with sex education classes). 
3. Compare Church and State Symposium, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 183 (1980)(compila-
tion of articles and cases on the permissible role of religion in public schools), with Com-
ment, Accommodating Religion in the Public Schools, 59 NEB. L. REV. 425 (1980)(urging 
a more tolerant attitude toward prayer, religious meetings, holiday celebrations, and in-
struction in certain religious subjects in the public schools). 
4. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)(holding official classroom prayer 
unconstitutional). 
5. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)(holding classroom recita-
tion of Bible unconstitutional). 
6. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)(per curiam)(holding state-mandated 
posting of the Ten Commandments in schoolrooms unconstitutional). 
7. See supra notes 4-6. 
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ing the theory of evolution8 in natural science classes.9 Funda-
mentalist Christian parents10 who believe the literal biblical ac-
count of Creation - "Biblical Creationism"11 - find evo-
8. Semantic confusion often stems from using the word "evolution" without some 
modifier. Evolution has come to mean many things, some of them quite distinct from 
what scientists consider the "theory of" evolution. For instance, evolution can mean 
merely "a process of change in a certain direction." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIC-
TIONARY 397 (1977). In a biological sense, evolution can be used to characterize relatively 
limited gene mutation and minor genetic variation among different populations of the 
same species, e.g., racial differences, and is sometimes called "microevolution" in this 
context. See, e.g., G. STEBBINS, VARIATION AND EvOLUTION IN PLANTS at x (1950). 
The meaning of "the theory of evolution" intended by this Note, however, is the 
"modern synthesis" or "neo-Darwinism," the modern successor of the theory proposed 
by Charles Darwin in his book On The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. 
Neo-Darwinism proposes that life on earth is evolving by mutation, natural selection, 
and other subtle natural pressures, from less complex to more complex organisms; that 
life has developed from nonliving precursors; and that over long periods of time, perhaps 
billions of years, subtle but increasingly adaptive changes have taken place in every 
known species. See E. WILSON, T. EISNER, W. BRIGGS, R. DICKERSON, R. METzENBERG, R. 
O'BRIEN, M. SUSMAN & w. BOGGS, LIFE ON EARTH 500-21, 631-711 & 760-69 (2d ed. 1978) 
(college biology text) [hereinafter cited as LIFE ON EARTH]. Neo-Darwinism in sometimes 
called "macroevolution." G. STEBBINS, supra, at x. Attempts to distinguish microevolu-
tion from macroevolution are difficult because, though botanists have produced new spe-
cies in the laboratory by hybridization, the observed "origin" of a new species in nature 
has yet to be documented. See L. THURMAN, How TO THINK AsoUT EVOLUTION & OTHER 
BIBLE SCIENCE CONTROVERSIES 93-96 (2d ed. 1978). The distinction is further complicated 
by some who do not use the term "species," but instead employ a somewhat broader 
characterization of life "kinds." Id. at 95. In general, however, the neo-Darwinian theory 
of evolution proposes that life formed from primordial organic and inorganic matter and 
evolved by speciation to its present composition. 
This theory of life's origination and subsequent speciation is sometimes misappre-
hended as being an explanation of the origin of the universe. Paleobiologists, however, 
attempt to explain how life on earth originated from nonlife; they pursue an entirely 
separate question from those astrogeophysicists attempting to explain how the galaxies, 
solar systems, and planets like the earth, first came to be. This "tenestrial evolution" of 
the planets is not what is meant by neo-Darwinism, though some of the same concepts 
may apply. Moreover, the question of how the original matter of the universe came to be 
lies beyond the realm of any scientific pursuit. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying 
text. 
9. Compare Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Con-
sumption?, 27 VAND. L. REV. 209 (1974)(defending the present method of teaching only 
the theory of evolution in the classroom), with Note, Freedom of Religion and Science 
Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515 (1978)(opposing the exclusive presenta-
tion of evolutionary theory on constitutional grounds). See generally L. THURMAN, supra 
note 8, at 17-35 (explaining the history of the debate and examining the response of the 
scientific community). 
10. Fundamentalist Christians support "a literal interpretation of the Bible and a 
belief in the inerrancy of the Scriptures." McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. 
Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Organized religions which adhere to this definition 
include Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Independent Baptists. See 
Note, supra note 9, at 519-21 nn.21-23. 
11. Biblical (Divine) Creationism is a Fundamentalist Christian belief based on a lit-
eral reading of Genesis, the first Book of the Old Testament. Biblical Creationism 
teaches that a Supreme Being - God - supernaturally created the universe in six crea-
tion days. This spontaneous creation out of nothing produced the first humans, Adam 
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lutionary theory repugnant to their regligious beliefs and those 
they wish to instill in their children.11 Creationist efforts 
to suppress the theory of evolution have, however, historically 
failed, 18 as have similar attempts to require the teaching of Bib-
lical Creationism ... These setbacks have prompted a new crea-
tionist movement which advocates that a creation model with no 
direct biblical references - "scientific creationism"111 - be 
and Eve, and all other life "kinds" on earth today. Biblical Creationists also believe that 
the elapsed time from the Creation to the present measures only in the thousands of 
years and that there has been in the interim a Great Flood, survived by Noah and repre-
sentatives of the earth's flora and fauna. See Genesis 1:1-8:22; see also 1 THE INTER-
PRETER'S BIBLE 456-548 (N. Harmond ed. 1952); J. MOORE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON 
CREATION/EVOLUTION 27 (1976)("The creation model is an explanatory belief system 
based upon the existence of an eternal Creator who established a complete, finished, and 
functional universe in all aspects regarding elements, galaxies, stars and planets .... "). 
12. The biblical account of Creation is considered to be irreconcilable with the neo-
Darwinian theory of evolution; thus, creationists consider the two approaches mutually 
exclusive. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D. Ark. 
1982); Note, supra note 9, at 519, 522. Consequently, some believers in creation accounts 
conclude that evolution theory actually denies the existence of God. See, e.g., H. MORRIS, 
THE TROUBLED WATERS OF EVOLUTION 186 (1974). Others argue that the theory of evolu-
tion, though perhaps not antitheistic per se, nevertheless undermines the ethics of Chris-
tian religion. See, e.g., A. KEITH, EvoLUTION AND ETHICS 15 (1947), quoted in H. MORRIS, 
supra, at 36; see also infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text. Consequently, Funda-
mentalist Christians have angrily opposed evolutionary theory through legislation and 
litigation. See infra note 13. 
13. Fundamentalist opposition to evolution theory prompted the statute that was 
challenged in the famous Scopes, or "monkey," trial. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105 
(1927). That statute, codified at ch. 27, 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 50, and since repealed, 
made it a crime to teach the theory of evolution in the public schools of Tennessee. 
Although the statute was then upheld, the public ridicule heaped on the statute's sup-
porters effectively stilled enforcement of that and similar statutes around the country. 
See Kalven, A Commemorative Case Note - Scopes v. State, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 505, 507 
(1960); Cole, A Witness at the Scopes Trial, Sci. AM., Jan. 1959, at 120, 130. Forty years 
later, the Supreme Court finally buried the movement to suppress evolution by striking 
down an Arkansas anti-evolution statute as unconstitutional. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97 (1968). 
14. Because the Supreme Court would not allow the theory of evolution to be sup-
pressed, Fundamentalists began to support the teaching of both Biblical Creationism 
and evolutionary theory in the classroom. See, e.g., ch. 377, 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1364 
(requiring commensurate classroom attention be given to Genesis and to evolution) 
(struck down in Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975)); see also Wright v. Hous-
ton lndep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972)(classroom presentation of 
Biblical Creationism held unconstitutional), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). Most creationists now concede the unconstitu-
tionality of teaching Biblical Creationism. See e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM 3 (H. Morris 
ed., general ed. 1974); Note, supra note 9, at 553-54. 
15. "Scientific creationism" is the name given to a creation model purported to stand 
independent of biblical reference. It proposes the "special creation" of all matter and life 
relatively recently (in the thousands of years), with little or no change in life "kinds" 
since that time. It also posits the theory of "catastrophism" (a catastrophic worldwide 
flood) as well as separate ancestry of man and apes. Note, supra note 9, at 554. Its sup-
porters claim that "scientific creationism" is distinct from Biblical Creationism and is 
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taught along with the theory of evolution in order to "balance" 
the classroom fare. 18 This new approach raises unresolved issues 
under the religion clauses of the first amendment17 and compels 
a reexamination of the role of science and religion in public 
education. 
This Note explores the propriety of teaching the theory of 
evolution and the scientific creation model in public18 elemen-
tary and secondary schools.19 Part I discusses the powers of the 
state and its political subdivisions to set public school policy and 
curriculum content and the extent to which those powers are cir-
cumscribed by the religion clauses of the first amendment. Part 
I concludes that the religion clauses permit the teaching of evo-
lutionary theory in public schools. Part II examines the variety 
of judicial and legislative relief potentially available to creation-
ists where the teaching of evolution theory interferes with their 
religious beliefs or practices. Part III concludes that, except for a 
small group of creationists, the exclusive presentation of the the-
ory of evolution in public schools warrants no constitutionally 
based relief. 
thus constitutional classroom material. See infra notes 147-74 and accompanying text. 
16. The idea of "balancing" evolution with a roughly equivalent presentation of crea-
tionist beliefs was first proposed in 1961 by Henry Morris, Director of the Institute for 
Creation Research in San Diego, California. Mr. Morris writes extensively on this subject 
and his ideas have prompted legal commentary, see, e.g., Note, supra note 9, as well as 
legislative response, see, e.g., the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolu-
tion-Science Act ("Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act"), ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1663-
1670 (1981 Supp.)(held unconstitutional in McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. 
Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)); see also Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and 
Evolution-Science Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 17:286.1 to .7 (West Supp. 1982)(currently 
being challenged in Aguillard v. Treen, Civ. Act. 81-4787 (E.D. La. filed Dec. 3, 1981), 
stayed pending jurisdictional decision in Keith v. Louisiana Dep't of Educ., Civ. Act. 81-
989 § B (M.D . .La. filed Dec. 2, 1981)). The Mississippi Senate has approved a balanced 
treatment hill, S. 2256 (Miss. 1982)(not passed by Miss. House), and a number of states, 
including Georgia and Florida, are contemplating passage of similar bills. N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 7, 1982, § 4, at 19, col. 1 (midw. ed.). 
17. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
18. The religion issues discussed in this Note do not arise in a private or parochial 
school. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(finding a constitutional right 
to attend private secretarian schools that teach religion). 
19. This Note does not cover the post-secondary setting. A different standard of con-
cern for sectarian influence applies in universities due to the greater knowledge and ma-
turity of college students. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)(finding 
college students less vulnerable to the coercive aspects of religion courses~. 
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I. THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 
The states have no constitutional duty to establish public 
schools. 20 Once established, however, state schools must comply 
with certain provisions of the federal Con~titution. 21 The first 
amendment's "religion clauses" place two important limitations 
on the government's authority over public education.22 These 
clauses command that Congress, and the states via the four-
teenth amendment,28 "shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."~• This 
section considers whether teaching the theory of evolution vio-
lates either religion clause. Because the Supreme Court ap-
proaches each clause differently, they must be examined sepa-
rately.211 This section concludes that under the Supreme Court's 
20. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)("Education, of 
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal 
Constitution."). 
21. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). 
22. Within these constitutional bounds, the states have almost plenary control over 
their educational institutions because public schools are arms of the states under the 
powers reserved by the tenth amendment. See Comment, School Boards, Schoolbooks 
and the Freedom to Learn, 59 YALE L.J. 928, 929 (1950). An educational provision is 
typically found in every state constitution. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, 1f 1; N.Y. 
CONST. art. XI, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards and the 
Constitution, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1092, 1095 (1980). See generally id. at 1095-97 (discuss-
ing the broad discretion granted state and local school boards by state constitutional 
provisions). 
Consequently, the states may add to, alter, or completely eliminate any part of their 
curriculum, so long as the change is not unconstitutional. States possess an "undoubted 
right to prescribe the curriculum for [their] public schools" so long as not restrictive of 
constitutional guarantees. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). But cf. Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(invalidating state law which forbade foreign language 
instruction in public schools). The Meyer Court cited no textual constitutional limitation 
on such action, however, and it has been suggested that the Court's decision was based 
on an anachronistic "substantive due process" approach. _See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. 
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624 (1978). The Epperson Court eschewed the Meyer 
Court's reliance on a broad reading of due process. 393 U.S. at 105-06. Nonetheless, cita-
tions to Meyer in recent cases suggest a revival of substantive due process analysis, at 
least outside the area of economic regulation. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 
153 (1973); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 501 (1977)(plurality opin-
ion); see also Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion 
Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159. The current vitality of Meyer in the public schools has 
not, however, been determined. See infra notes 182-87. 
23. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
25. The Supreme Court has not always viewed the clauses as distinct. See, e.g., 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). By 1947, however, the separate scope of 
each clause began to emerge. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13-15 
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analyses of each of these clauses, evolutionary theory is a consti-
tutionally permissible element of a public school curriculum. 
A. Evolution Theory and the Establishment Clause 
The establishment clause was designed in part to guarantee 
separation of church and state. 26 A literal interpretation of this 
command led the Supreme Court to suggest a strict separation 
between the two.27 Later cases, however, recognized a zone of 
(1947). The Everson Court suggested that the dual clauses were complementary. Id. 
While this is often true, later cases recognized the potential conflict between the clauses. 
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-99 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring). See generally J. Now AK, 
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 849 (describing the "natural antagonism be-
tween a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice"); 
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 673, 674 (1980)(analyzing the "seemingly irreconcilable conflict"). This rec-
ognition led to entirely distinct methods of analysis. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (197l)(outlining establishment test), with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972)(applying a much different free exercise analysis). 
26. "Framer's intent" arguments are not always useful or enlightening. See School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring)("A too literal quest 
for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon [the religion clauses seems] futile and mis-
directed."); Choper, Religion in the Public School: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 
47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 332 (1963)(scholarly investigation of the precise intention of the 
Framers has produced antithetic conclusions). But see Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment, 11 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 151, 182 (1981)(the Framers' original 
intent "seems . . . far simpler than one would suspect from the Court's convoluted pro-
nouncements"). Nevertheless, there is little disagreement that these first words of the 
Bill of Rights were written to guarantee the religious freedom and protection from state 
control which had prompted many Europeans to immigrate to America. See Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1947)(detailing the liistory of religious persecution in 
Europe at the time of colonization and the efforts of Madison and Jefferson to guarantee 
religious liberty by drafting the religion clauses); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND 
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1964)(describing the centuries of religious persecution 
preceding the colonization of America); see also Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of 
American Science, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 4-5 (explaining the motivation of the Framers to 
protect secular pursuits such as science from religious oppression); Comment, supra note 
3, at 427-29 (explaining the tolerant religious attitudes of the colonists which arose out of 
their experience with religious persecution). 
Beyond this, there is little hope of ascertaining the exact intent of the Framers in light 
of the vigorous debate that accompanied the addition of the religion clauses to the Con-
stitution. Concerns ranged from too much religion in government to too much goven-
ment involvement in religion: "Some supporters of the establishment clause sought to 
protect the state from the church, others sought to protect the church from the state, 
and still others opposed federal establishment of religion because it threatened state es-
tablishments they favored." Goldberg, supra, at 5. n.23 (citing M. HowE, THE GARDEN 
AND THE WILDNERNESS 6, 25-26 (1965)); see also Note, The Establishment Clause and its 
Application in the Public School, 59 NEB. L. REV. 1143, 1145-47 (1980). See generally J. 
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 849-50. 
27. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). Historic fear of government 
attempts to influence and control religious beliefs apparently led to this per se interpre-
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permissible accommodation.28 These decisions found strict sepa-
ration impermissibly hostile to religion29 as well as a denial of 
the pervasive influence of religion on American institutions. 30 
The proper role of government, therefore, is neither to support 
nor undermine religion or a particular religious point of view, 
but rather to remain "neutral" between religion and irreligion. 31 
tation. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963)("a union of government 
and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion"). This approach 
prompted the Everson Court to detail some of the contours of the establishment clause: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away 
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
. religion. 
330 U.S. at 15. 
28. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)("the line of separation, far 
from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending on all the 
circumstances of a particular relationship"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 
(1952)("The First Amendment ... does not say that in every and all respects there shall 
be a separation of Church and State."). 
29. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)(suggesting that if the rule were 
absolute separation, "the state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile, 
suspicious, and even unfriendly"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 
(1963)(holding that state action may not advance or inhibit religion); see also Figinski, 
Military Chaplains - A Constitutionally Permissible Accommodation Between Church 
and State, 24 Mo. L. REV. 377, 408-09 (1964)(citing the need to avoid impermissible 
hostility as a justification for providing chaplains and churches at military bases). 
30. The variety of permissible state/religion conjunctions includes chaplains at mili-
tary establishments, prayers invoked prior to legislative sessions, and the use of "In God 
We Trust" on coins, buildings, and documents. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
296-304 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Zo-
rach v. Clauson, suggested that strict separation would preclude police and fire protec-
tion for religious groups, the use of appeals to the Almighty in courtroom oaths, and even 
the Supreme Court's opening supplication, "God save the United States and this Honor-
able Court": "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 
343 U.S. at 312-13. For a long list of governmental "aids" to religion, see Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421, 439-43 (1962)(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 446-49 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
31. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968)(Arkansas anti-evolution 
law found not to be "an act of religious neutrality"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 222 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963). But see Le Clercq, supra 
note 9, at 216 ("The litany of such metaphysical concepts as religious neutrality [is] 
confusing and of little analytical or predictive value."). 
Confusion has arisen out of the establishment cases because the Supreme Court once 
suggested that government must maintain "neutrality between religion and religion, and 
between religion and nonreligion." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Taken 
literally, this standard would bar government from pursuing nonreligious, i.e., secular, 
goals - an absurd result. "The appropriate dichotomy is between religion and irreligion, 
not between religion and nonreligion: government must remain neutral, not between 
those who hold no religious viewpoint, but between those who favor and those who op-
pose some or all religious views." Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consis-
tent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805, 
813 (1978)(emphasis added); see also Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Estab-
lishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 698-99, 719 (1968)(distinguishing "religion," 
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To insure this neutrality, state action must meet a three-part 
test: first, the action must have a secular purpose; second, the 
action must not have as its principal or primary effect the ad-
vancement or inhibition of religion; and finally, the action must 
not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with relig-
ion. 32 Any government program which satisfies this test avoids 
an establishment violation. 33 
"irreligion," and "nonreligion"). By not recognizing these distinctions, the Court assumes 
the impossible task of maintaining impartiality between religion and nonreligion in a 
government whose opinions are supposed to be solely nonreligious. Indeed, concerns 
about establishing a "religion of secularism" should be irrelevant to a government that is 
ultimately premised on wholly secular politics. Merel, supra, at 813. 
32. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In practice and in the cases there is 
only a metaphysical difference between purpose and primary effect. See Merel, supra 
note 31, at 826 (although the Court claims secular purpose and primary effects "are dis-
tinct, the facts on which it has relied to determine primary effects are often indistin-
guishable from [those relied upon to determine] legislative purpose"). Ostensibly the sec-
ular purpose test is a test of legislative motivation. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. In Epperson, 
however, the Court relied on newspaper ads and letters to the editor to ascertain pur-
pose. 393 U.S. at 108 n.16. Other cases look beyond the legislature and focus on the 
supporters of certain state actions. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 
1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)(making the purpose of the Fundamentalist sponsors of the bill an 
important consideration); Hendren v. Campbell, 45 U.S.L.W. 2530 (May 17, 1977) 
(Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14, 1977)(holding that the religious purpose of the book publisher 
triggers the establishment clause prohibition); see also Merel, supra note 31, at 824 
("Purpose can be tested by reference to a number of factors, including legislative or 
administrative history and the avowed intent of individual legislators."). But cf. Note, 
supra note 9, at 562 (purpose test should not focus on the authors of textbooks but on 
the intent of the public school authorities who adopt it). In addition, "purpose" can 
mean intended effect. In this way, purpose and effect are merged, because a religious 
effect is prohibited whether intended or not. Consequently, a more accurate terminology 
would be "proponent motivation" for purpose, and "primary intended and/or actual ef-
fects," that is, the hoped for and/or practical outcome of the action, for primary effect. 
Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967)(examining, legislation "in terms of its 
'immediate objective,' its 'ultimate effect' and its 'historical context and the conditions 
existing prior to its enactment' "); Merel, supra note 31, at 824-25 (suggesting an "obvi-
ous effects" test for secular purpose, similar to that used to discover de· facto racial dis-
crimination). Thus, this Note's use of the "purpose and primary effect" terminology 
should be viewed as conforming with a standard and convenient shorthand rather than 
an affirmation of its conceptual accuracy. 
Another conceptual difficulty with the Supreme Court's establishment test is its failure 
to define explicity "religion." Instead of making this determination at the outset, the 
Court seems to make the determination implicitly; after evaluating the complained-of 
activity under the Lemon test, the Court concludes it is religion if it fails and not religion 
if it passes. Part of this sidestepping by the Court stems from the fact that no recent 
establishment case has presented the question of whether the activity was, in fact, "relig-
ion." Merel, supra note 31, at 836. The Court has made pronouncements of what consti-
tutes religion in the free exercise area, but the scope of the definition necessary to in-
clude the sometimes unorthodox beliefs of free exercise complainants is much too broad 
to be of use in establishment cases. See infra notes 41-43 & 91-95 and accompanying 
text. 
33. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether public school instruction in evo-
lutionary theory survives this scrutiny. Epperson v. Arkansas held implicitly that teach-
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1. Secular purpose- Legislation prompted primarily by reli-
gious motivations violates the establishment clause and will not 
be upheld. 3" It is often difficult, however, to determine whether 
the purpose of legislation is religious or secular.35 Even a specific 
statutory avowal of nonreligious intent - such as a preamble 
listing numerous secular purposes - is not dispositive. 36 In 
Stone v. Graham,37 for example, the Court went behind the 
stated secular purpose of a statute mandating the posting of the 
Ten Commandments in classrooms, finding that the "undeniably 
sacred" text promoted Judeo-Christian religious beliefs.38 Thus, 
ing the theory of evolution was not an establishment violation, because such a finding 
would have been fatal to the mandatory presentation of evolution theory then practiced. 
But that concern was not the issue upon which the Court focused. 393 U.S. at 103. Sev-
eral lower courts have found no establishment violation in the presentation of evolution. 
See, e.g., McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1274 (E.D. Ark. 
1982)(teaching the theory of evolution); accord Wright v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 
366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (1980)(museum 
exhibit concerning evolution); Willoughby v. Stever, No. 1574-72 (D.D.C. May 18, 
1973)(National Science Foundation funding for textbooks teaching evolution), aff'd 
mem., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 297 (1975). See generally 
Goldberg, supra note 26, at 28. 
34. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)(per curiam)(posting Ten Commandments); 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)(banning evolution); School Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203 (1968)(classroom prayer). 
35. Secular purpose is a somewhat misleading category. What the Court actually 
means is that a significant religious or sectarian purpose will be fatal, regardless of possi-
ble secular justifications for the act; the Court is looking for religious purposes which 
invalidate the act, not secular purposes which might save it. See, e.g., School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963)(although Bible study has a possible secular pur-
pose, the presence of a religious purpose is fatal). 
36. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)(hold-
ing unconstitutional the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act). The Arkansas act included 
a carefully worded preamble of secular purposes: 
Legislative Declaration of Purpose. This Legislature enacts this Act for public 
schools with the purpose of protecting academic freedom for students' differing 
values and beliefs; ensuring neutrality toward students' diverse religious convic-
tions; ensuring freedom of religious exercise for students and their parents; guar-
anteeing freedom of belief and speech for students; preventing establishment of 
Theologically Liberal, Humanist, Nontheist or Atheist religions; preventing dis-
crimination against students on the basis of their personal beliefs concerning 
creation and evolution; and assisting students in their search for the truth. This 
Legislature does not have the purpose of causing instruction in religious con-
cepts or making an establishment of religion. 
Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1668 (1981 Supp.)(emphasis 
added); cf. Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act, LA. 
REv." STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West Supp. 1982) (stating simply that the Act is "enacted 
for the purpose of protecting academic freedom"). 
37. 449 U.S. 39 (1980)(per curiam). 
38. Id. at 41. See Comment, Stone v. Graham: A Fragile Defense of Individual Reli-
gious Autonomy, 69 Kv. L.J. 392, 401 (1980-1981)(noting that the Court ignored a num-
ber of secular purposes on the face of the statute). Until Stone it was thought that pur-
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courts will ignore statutory statements of secular purpose where 
they are mere shams. 
Many creationists argue that the state has a nonsecular pur-
pose in teaching the theory of evolution. Their arguments take 
two forms. First, they reason that evolutionary theory is a relig-
ion; consequently, mandating instruction in evolution has a reli-
gious purpose. 89 Second, they argue that, even assuming evolu-
tion is not a religion, the motivation of evolution's proponents is 
to advance or inhibit some evolution-based religion.''0 Neither 
argument, however, survives close scrutiny. 
a. The theory of evolution is not an establishment-religion-
In order to protect establishment clause values without exces-
sively limiting government actions, "establishment-religion" 
should be defined narrowly.41 Commentators suggest that an es-
pose could be judged only from the act's stated purpose. Because that could easily be 
made secular, though, the purpose test was considered perfunctory. See L. TRIBE, AMERI· 
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-8, at 836 (1978)("the Court will usually find in the statu-
tory language or elsewhere a secular purpose [and) then move on"); Comment, A Worka-
ble Definition of the Establishment Clause: Allen v. Morton Raises New Questions, 62 
GEO. L.J. 1461, 1464-65 (1974)(the presence of "a singular primary secular goal" is ade-
quate to save an act regardless of any sectarian purpose present). 
39. See, e.g., Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 740 (1980)(museum displays 
on evolution alleged to violate the establishment clause by promoting the religion of Sec-
ular Humanism); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 
(1972)(public school presentation of evolution theory alleged to be religious), alf'd per 
curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Arkansas Bal-
anced Treatment Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1669(0 (1981 Supp.)(public school presenta-
tion of evolution "produces hostility toward many Theistic religions and brings prefer-
ence to [Nontheistic religions which) include a religious belief in evolution"); H. MORRIS, 
supra note 12, at 172 (evolution is "fundamentally a religion, rather than a science"). 
Mr. Morris expands on this point elsewhere: 
Evolution is, in fact, a religious belief in [a broad] sense, and so is atheism. In 
fact, there is one very cogent reason why creationists object to the exclusive 
teaching of evolution in the schools, since in effect this amounts to indoctrinat-
ing young people in a particular religion, with its own system of ethics and val-
ues and ultimate meanings. 
SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 196. 
40. See, e.g., H. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 37-40. 
41. A different case holds under the free exercise clause where constitutional values 
mandate a broad definition of religion, affording complainants the right to define religion 
in their own terms. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 
U.S. 707, 715 (1981)(complainant "drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he 
drew was an unreasonable one"). If the free exercise definition were the establishment 
clause standard, however, almost any governmental act which advanced or inhibited that 
"religion" as defined by the complainant could trigger a violation, no matter how bizarre 
the claim might be. 
If religion need not be predicated on a belief in God or even in a god and if it 
may not be tested by the common consensus of what reasonable men would rea-
sonably call religion, if it is so private that - so long as it does not inflict injury 
on society - it is immured from governmental interference and from judicial 
inquiry, [might] not a group of gymnasts proclaiming on their trampolines that 
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tablishment-religion is religion according to the "man on the 
street."42 A broader definition might implicate many secular 
physical culture is their religion be engaged in a religious exercise? 
Manning, The Douglas Concept of God in Government, 39 WASH. L. REV. 47, 63 (1964). 
Under such a broad definition congressional appropriations to help these gymnasts "pur-
sue their cult" by going to the Olympics might establish religion. Id. at 66. A similar 
concern was posed by Professor Kauper when he noted that Communism, "with its disci-
pline, its cultus, its sense of community, and its obligation to duties owing the system" 
has a clear resemblance to religion. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 31 
(1964); cf. Note, Transcendental Meditation and the Meaning of Religion Under the 
Establishment Clause, 62 MINN. L. REv. 887, 909 (1978)(conceding that Marxism resem-
bles religion, but distinguishing it from establishment-religions on the grounds that 
Marxism is not as "comprehensive" as establishment-religion and does not lay claim to 
"ultimate truth") [hereinafter cited as Note, Transcendental Meditation]. Even the ide-
ology of democracy, at least for some who espouse it with almost religious passion, might 
qualify as a religion under the free exercise standard. P. KAUPER, supra, at 31. And if 
promoting democracy has a religious purpose, government itself would establish religion. 
Cf. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056, 1083-
84 (1978)(a broad definition of religion for establishment clause purposes "could lead to 
hopelessly intricate and expensive restrictions on the state's capacity to take action") 
[hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutional Definition]; see also Comment, Religious Ac-
tivity in Public Schools: A Proposed Standard, 24 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 379, 389 (1980)[here-
inafter cited as Comment, Religious Activity]; Comment, Teaching Transcendental 
Meditation in Public Schools: Defining Religion for Establishment Purposes, 16 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 325, 340 (1979)(broad functional definition of religion in establishment 
clause litigation would "paralyze governmental action in the broad areas of public health, 
welfare, safety, and morals")[hereinafter cited as Comment, Defining Religion]. See gen-
erally L. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 14-8, at 835-36. 
The sometimes competing values of the two religion clauses create a certain amount of 
tension. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); J. NOWAK, 
R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 22, at 849; Choper, supra· note 25, at 674. This 
conflict at the intersection of the religion clauses has prompted some commentators to 
look for the more "fundamental" of the two, see, e.g., Moore, The Supreme Court and 
the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEx. L. 
REV. 142, 179 (1963)(establishment clause was designed to help implement the free exer-
cise clause), while others attempt to reconcile the clauses, see, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 
31, at 693; Note, supra note 9, at 543. Such attempts have proven difficult, and judicial 
attempts at reconciliation have produced disparate results. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)(strict separation); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 
(1952)(accommodation); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)(neutrality). 
See generally Buchanan, Accommodation of Religion in the Public Schools: A Plea for 
Careful Balancing of Competing Constitutional Values, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1000, 1001-
11 (1981). Part of this difficulty stems from the lack of any indication that either clause 
was intended to dominate the other. See Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Con-
stitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REv. 561, 568-69 (1980). 
The best way to ameliorate this tension is to define "religion" differently under each 
clause. This approach has been criticized because the word "religion" is used only once 
in the first amendment, perhaps implying but one definition. See, e.g., Everson v. Board 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947)(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, a bifurcated defi-
nition of religion is indispensable in resolving the conflict between free exercise and es-
tablishment. Note, Constitutional Definition, supra, at 1085 & n.138; see infra notes 91-
93 and accompanying text. 
42. See, e.g., Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?, 
1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 266-67 (For purposes of the establishment clause the "effect and 
purpose of government action are not to be assessed by the religious sensibilities of the 
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government actions not generally considered religious or irrelig-
ious. At the very least, this narrow establishment standard 
would encompass all religions professing purportedly absolute 
truths and a general belief in a transcendent reality.0 
Under this definition, evolutionary theory does not qualify as 
religion. Evolutionary theory, like all scientific theories, presup-
poses neither the existence nor absence of a transcendent being 
and makes no claim to absolute truths. 44 The evolution of spe-
cies may be guided by the hand of God or by the workings of a 
godless mechanistic universe, but evolutionary theory has noth-
ing to say about this issue.0 Although evolutionary theory, like 
person who is complaining of the alleged establishment. It must be essentially religious 
in some widely shared public understanding."). 
43. Several commentators have attempted to define religion for purposes of the relig-
i_on clauses. See, e.g., Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free 
Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 309, 355-64 (defining the parameters of free exercise 
religion); Note, Transcendental Meditation, supra note 41, at 905 (defining religion for 
establishment purposes). The elements common to most of these definitions include 
claims of immutable, absolute truths, and belief in a transcendent reality. There are, of 
course, other elements which many see as religious, such as institutionalization and sym-
bolic trappings. See, e.g., id. But absolute truths and a transcendent reality are at the 
core. 
44. Some claim that the astrogeophysical theory of the "big bang," the theory that 
the entire universe has extruded from a single massive explosion of super-dense matter, 
is an attempt by scientists to "explain" the origin of all matter and life, thus denying the 
existence of God. See, e.g., J. MooRE, supra note 11, at 62 (quoting Colossians 2:8). 
Creationists correctly recognize, however, that science does not account for the original 
super-dense state. SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 28. Nor will science ever so 
account, for that is the realm of philosophy and religion. See A. VAN MELSEN, EVOLUTION 
AND PHILOSOPHY 150 (1965); G. SIMPSON, THE MEANING OF EVOLUTION 279 (rev. ed. 1967). 
Darwin himself realized that his theory did not answer that question: "[I] feel compelled 
to look for a First Cause [but the] mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by 
us." C. DARWIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES DARWIN AND SELECTED LETTERS 66 (F. 
Darwin ed. 1958). 
Misapprehension that the theory of evolution explains the origin of the universe may 
stem from confusing the origin of the universe with the origin of life. Even Darwin could 
not foresee that, given the initial matter of the universe, evolutionary theory would be 
adequate to explain the resultant emergence of life from nonlife. See id. at 272 ("It is 
mere rubbish, thinking at present of the origin of life; one might as well think of the 
origin of matter."). Since Darwin's day, however, scientists have devised a now well-ac-
cepted mechanism by which life could originate out of the nonlife believed to exist bil-
lions of years past - the Oparin-Haldane theory. See LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 
503-21 (evolving organic molecules led to even more complex clusters, eventually to pro-
teins, and ultimately to simple self-replicating "life forms"); see also A. LEHNINGER, BIO-
CHEMISTRY 1031-55 (2d ed. 1975)(detailing the biochemical processes which predated the 
first "life" forms). For an example of contemporary research into prebiotic ("before life") 
evolution, see Eigen, Gardiner, Schuster & Winkler-Oswatitsch, The Origin of Genetic 
Information, Sc,. AM., Apr. 1981, at 88 (using experiments with bacterial viruses, as well 
as studies of the components of proteins and nucleic acids, to construct inductively a 
theory of prebiotic evolution)[hereinafter cited as Eigen]. 
45. Mayer, The Nineteenth Century Revisited, BSCS NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1972, at 12 
(quoted in Note, supra note 9, at 519 n.20) ("[s]cience is neutral with regard to the 
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some religions, attempts to explain certain features of the world, 
the two use radically different epistemologies. Because the the-
ory of evolution takes no stance on the issue of a supreme be-
ing's existence, it does not - and cannot - explain empirical 
data by reference to a transcendent reality.'6 Instead, it applies 
the scientific method'7 to postulate a natural principle of species 
development. Conversely, those religions which purport to ex-
plain the presence of life - especially human life - customarily 
rely on a transcendent being. Religion and evolutionary theory 
are thus sharply distinguishable. 
Evolutionary theory is based on observation and analysis of 
data and experimentation. Some, however, have taken issue with 
this claim, arguing that evolution cannot be experimentally ob-
theological implications arising out of scientific investigation"). Science is only a tech-
nique, a neutral tool with which to analyze data in the natural world. The uses to which 
that tool is applied, however, are not always neutral. A classic example is Social Darwin-
ism, which used Darwin's phrase "survival of the fittest" to justify the distribution of 
wealth and political power in the world. See R. HOFSTADTER, Soc1AL DARWINISM IN AMER-
ICAN THOUGHT 5-6 (rev. ed. 1959). Such aberrant uses of science prompt some to claim 
that science in general - and evolution theory in particular - is a value system based 
on atheism. See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text. This completely confuses the 
theory of evolution with the ends to which it may be applied, for science cannot address 
ultimate values: "[Science] can never even approach the answer to the last questions: 
'Why is there a world at all rather than nothing?' and 'why is the world such as it is and 
not different?' " Baier, The Meaning of Life: Christianity Versus Science, in PHILOSO-
PHY FOR A NEW GENERATION 656 (3d ed. 1977). 
46. See Resolution, National Academy of Sciences, Oct. 17, 1972,paraphrased in Le 
Clercq, supra note 9, at 219 (the basic precepts of natural science exclude resorting to 
supernatural causes because there are no objective criteria by which to validate them). 
Nevertheless, some have argued that because the theory of evolution postulates a "de-
sign" in nature, it presupposes a "designer." See Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.209. Evolu-
tionary theory's "design," however, merely sets forth the functional relationships among 
species; it does not presuppose that some being ordered the development of life. Teleol-
ogy in the world of the natural scientist means merely search for design in nature as 
evidence of the interrelation of species and natural order. See Aulie, The Doctrine of 
Special Creation, 34 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 191, 196 (1972)(explaining how biologists re-
search design to "determine the material connections among contingent events"); see 
also LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 631. 
47. The scientific method is applied to sensate data (empirical data collected from 
the natural world) from which scientists hypothesize theories to correlate the known em-
pirical data with a minimum of contradictions or internal inconsistencies. See, e.g., BIO-
LOGICAL SCIENCES CURRICULUM STUDY, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE: MOLECULES TO MAN 14-21 
(rev. ed. 1968); Baier, supra note 45, at 652, 654; Lederberg, The Freedoms and the 
Control of ·Science: Notes from the Iuory Tower, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 596, 599 (1!}72). 
When new empirical data come to light the theory is reexamined and, if necessary, re-
vised. The McLean court pieced together a definition of science which further explains 
this epistemology: (1) it is guided by natural law; (2) it must be explanatory by reference 
only to natural laws; (3) it is testable against the known empirical data; (4) its conclu-
sions are tentative and subject to change with increased understanding and more coher-
ent explanations;· (5) it is falsifiable, that is, logically rigorous and not dependent on 
axioms or postulates which cannot themselves be proven by reference to natural law: See 
McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
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served or fully verified'8 and "is as religious as creation. "49 These 
skeptics contend that no single demonstrable macroevolutionary 
experiment has ever been successfully performed.60 But there is 
evidence for several demonstrable speciations,61 as well as evi-
dence of how life originally formed on earth. 62 Critics further 
contend that even if evolutionary experiments could reproduce 
life, that would not prove that present life formed in that fash-
ion, but only that it could have.63 They assert that residual evi-
dence - as opposed to direct observation - is inadequate for 
scientific purposes. 64 Yet many rigorous scientific theories were 
derived long before direct observation became possible,66 or from 
data collected long after the analyzed event. 66 Scientists hope to 
show only that evolution is one feasible mechanism for the de-
velopment of life on earth. The theory of evolution will not be 
considered a fact, or a "law of science," until the evidence is suf-
ficient to convince the scientific community that no feasible al-
48. See, e.g., Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1669(c) (1981 
Supp.); $cIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 4-8. See generally Bird, Freedom from 
Establishment Unneutrality in Public School Instruction and Religious School Regula-
tion, 2 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL. 125, 198-99 (1979); Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.209. One 
explanation for this confusion is the variety of ideas encompassed by the terms "evolu-
tion" or "origins." While the origin of the universe is beyond science, the origin of life, of 
differing species, and of man are eminently subject to scientific analysis. See supra note 
44. 
49. H. Morris, Introducing Scientific Creationism into the Public Schools 1 (Institute 
for Creation Research 1975), cited in Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.209. 
50. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 6-7 (claiming that species 
origination takes too long to be observed by scientists). 
51. Scientists point out that new species have been created "in the laboratory and in 
the experimental garden." LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 635. 
52. See Eigen, supra note 44, at 88. 
53. See, e.g., L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 99; cf. BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN 
COMPLEXITY 455 J. Moore & J. Slusher (rev. ed. 1974)(scientists may synthesize life but 
they can never create it). 
54. See J. MooRE, supra note 11, at 22. 
55. One recent commentary on the origins of life states: 
Fragmentary information . . . has never been a barrier to tlie discovery of 
laws of nature. Newton discovered tlie universal laws of motion from observa-
tions of a few planets; Mendeleev discovered tlie structure of the periodic table 
in the chemistry of only a few elements . . . . One does not need a detailed 
history of prebioti conditions and events in order to discover tlie evolutionary 
laws that led to the first life on the earth. 
Eigen, supra note 44, at 88. 
56. The demand for actual observability of the first events of evolutionary develop-
ment is, of course, impossible to fulfill, for by hypothesis no observer was then present. 
This argument, however, misapprehends the inferential nature of scientific research. A 
scientist who sees a burned-out forest with slight recent growth, though perhaps unable 
to ascertain the "first cause" of the fire, can validly infer that there was in fact a fire. By 
the same token, residual evidence of early civilizations provides evidence for anthropo-
logical science. The same technique can be applied to the residual fossil and geological 
evidence employed by evolution's researchers. 
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ternative exists, as occurred with the theory, now accepted fact, 
of heliocentricity.117 
Evolution, though comprehensive, propounds no absolute 
truths which induce religious beliefs.118 Because it is based on 
empirical analysis, evolution may be discredited by substantial 
falsifying data. 69 Religious postulates, in contrast, often derived 
from scripture or revelation, attest to absolute truths: they can-
not be modified or abandoned in light of new data.80 Thus, a 
religious proposition, unlike the theory of evolution, is neither 
based on nor modifiable by empirical data. 
Evolutionary theory, therefore, is not an "establishment-relig-
ion." In this respect, a government directive to teach the doc-
trine has no religious purpose. Nevertheless, persons may put a 
secular subject to the service of a religious end. Government 
mandates to teach evolutionary principles have not been im-
mune from this criticism. 
b. Evolution's promoters are not religiously or irreligiously 
motivated- Some argue that the proponents of evolutionary 
theory are motivated by a desire to discredit religious explana-
tions of the origin of human life. 81 They reason that the promo-
57. A useful comparison can be drawn beween the theories of evolution and relativ-
ity, and the well-accepted fact of heliocentricity. Like relativity and evolution, heliocen-
tricity was unpopular when first proposed. See D. STIMSON, THE GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE OP 
THE COPERNICAN THEORY OP THE UNIVERSE 71-84 (1917). Religiously motivated opponents 
tried to suppress the idea that the earth - and thus man - was not at the center of the 
universe. Id. Nevertheless, careful scientific measurement and increasingly sohisticated 
telescopes proved what Galileo and Copernicus already knew, and the· "theory" of he-
Jiocentricity became established fact. Id. at 85-94. A similar process is at work with Ein-
stein's theory of relativity, but controversy remains with respect to its certainty. See 
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1982, at A13, col. 1. The theory of evolution is at a similar juncture. 
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at 22, col. 1 (midw. ed.). 
58. See Note, Transcendental Meditation, supra note 41, at 901. 
59. "There is not a reputable biologist alive who would not jettison the evolution 
theory were a better scientific theory postulated concerning evolution." Mayer, Merrill, 
Ost, Stebbins & Welch, Statements by Scientists in the California Textbook Dispute, 34 
AM. BIOLOGY TcHR. 411, 412 (1972)(quoting William v. Mayer) [hereinafter cited as 
Mayer]. Darwin himself recognized that falsification techniques exist: "H it could be 
demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been 
formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break 
down." C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OP SPECIES 135 (Modem Library ed.) (1st ed. 1859). "Hit 
could be proved that any part of the structure of any one species had been formed for 
the exclusive good of another species, it would annihilate my theory, for such could not 
have been produced through natural selection." Id. at 148. See generally Alexander, 
Evolution, Creation, and Biology Teaching, 40 AM. BIOLOGY TcHR. 91, 102-03 (1978). 
60. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1269 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
61. See id. at 1261 ("I view this whole battle as one between God and anti-God 
forces. . .")(quoting drafter of the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act). Creationists see 
"evolutionists" as a pervasive threat to American life, out to destroy the fabric of society: 
[T]he theory of evolution is the philosophical foundation for all secular thought 
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tion of evolutionary theory is so motivated because it contradicts 
the biblical account of Creation. 62 Despite this contradiction, 
however, it does not follow that individuals promote evolution-
ary theory in order to discredit Creation.68 Rather, they dissemi-
nate the theory out of devotion to rigorous empirical analysis -
analysis which supports the theory of evolution.64 Accordingly, 
they are prepared to switch their allegiance as soon as the evi-
dence suggests a different and improved explanation.86 Instruc-
tion in evolutionary theory, therefore, is not intended to refute 
the Bible, but rather to extend empirical analysis and explana-
tions into the origin and development of life on earth. 66 
While teaching the theory of evolution easily passes the secu-
lar purpose test, there remains an even stronger ground for find-
ing evolution constitutionally acceptable: the primary effects 
test. This test does not rely on the difficult-to-show subjective 
intent of state officials, but rather on the actual effects of the 
state action. 
2. Primary effects- State action may not have more than "a 
remote and incidental effect advantageous to religious institu-
tions."67 Even if a primary secular effect can be found, the state 
action is constitutionally barred if there remains any "direct and 
immediate effect" advancing or inhibiting religion.68 In contrast, 
today, from education to biology and from psychology through the social sci-
ences. It is the platform from which socialism, communism, humanism, deter-
minism, and one-worldism have been launched . . . . Accepting man as animal, 
its advocates endorse animalistic behavior such as free love, situation ethics, 
drugs, divorce, abortion and a host of other ideas that contribute to men's pre-
sent futility and despair. 
LaHaye, Introduction to H. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 5; see also McLean, 529 F. Supp. 
at 1260 (citing H. MORRIS & CLARK, THE BIBLE HAS THE ANSWER); Titus, God, Evolution, 
Legal Education and Law, 1980 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 11, 37-38, 43. 
62. SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 215. 
63. Creationists claim that the science community is "close-minded" on the subject 
of creationism. See McLean, 529 F.Supp. at 1268. But see id. ("It is ... inconceivable 
that such a loose knit group of independent thinkers in all the varied fields of science 
could, or would, so effectively censor new scientific thought."). 
64. Scientists constantly discuss and reevaluate the theory of evolution. See, e.g., 
Reseach News, Evolutionary Theory Under Fire, 210 SCIENCE 883 (1980)(reporting on 
recent conference which explored the problems with the theory of evolution, as well as 
various proposed solutions to answer those problems); N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at 22, 
col. 1 (midw. ed.)(noting the continuing controversy between evolutionary scientists). 
65. See supra note 59. 
66. See Hurd, Bybee, Kahle & Yager, Biology Education in Secondary Schools of the 
United States, 42 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 389, 391 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Hurd]. 
67. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973). 
68. Id. (finding some legitimate end under the state's police power does not immu-
nize the statute "from further examination to ascertain whether it also has the direct 
and immediate effect of advancing religion"). See generally Note, supra note 26, at 1162 
n.114. 
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state action which merely harmonizes with the tenets of an es-
tablishment-religion does not run afoul of the first amendment.69 
The teaching of evolution theory has been said to advance sec-
ular humanism, atheism, and nontheism.70 The theory of evolu-
tion does harmonize with the tenets of certain splinter religions 
like Secular Humanism, but that is an incidental and unin-
tended effect. 71 The primary effect of teaching evolution is the 
fortification of scientific analysis, not the advancement of any 
harmonizing religion. 72 
Just as governmental action may not have the primary effect 
69. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445-48 (1961)(although Sunday closing 
laws may at one· time have been religiously motivated, that impermissible purpose has 
dissipated, and the law now merely harmonizes with Sunday-off religions); School Dist. 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring)(murder laws that accord 
with religious tenets do not establish religion). One commentator has proposed the fol-
lowing test to determine whether the actual or intended primary effects are secular: 
"Would the legislature have acted as it did were there no interdependency with religion 
involved? If so, then I think it would be fair to say that there is no subsidy of religion, 
that the religious benefits are constitutionally permitted side effects." Sugarman, New 
Perspectives on "Aid" to Private School Users, in NONPUBLIC SCHOOL Am 64, 66 (E. 
West ed. 1976). 
The cases have never succeeded in refining this standard, but have relied instead on ad 
hoc factual determinations. Consequently, the standard is much simpler to state than to 
apply. For instance, religious material intended to be used for its religious value has 
always been banned, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (posting Ten 
Commandments); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)(Bible study), but even 
Schempp suggests in dictum that a comparative religion course which employed the Bi-
ble for secular study would be allowed, id. at 225. Yet, the "mere possibility" that reli-
gious groups "might" use a federally financed building in 20 years was justification 
enough to halt funding in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). See Committee for 
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973). 
At some point the connection with religion becomes so tenuous that, though the gov-
ernment act technically "aids" religion by relieving certain financial obligations, it is not 
considered aid to religion. One example is provision of police and fire protection to paro-
chial schools. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. See generally L. TRmE, supra 
note 38, at § 14-9; P. KAUPER, supra note 41, at 108. 
70. See supra notes 39 & 48-62; cf. Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act, ARK. STAT. 
ANN. § 80-1669(0 (1981 Supp.)(public school presentation of evolution "brings prefer-
ence to Theological Liberalism, Humanism, Non-theistic religions and Atheism"). 
71. Such an incidental and unintended effect does not violate the establishment 
clause. See, e.g., Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 742-43 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(ad-
vancing Secular Humanism via museum displays on evolution is not prohibited due to 
incidental, unintended effect); Willoughby v. Stever, No. 1574-72 (D.D.C. May 18, 
1973)(textbook on evolution only incidentally affects religion), aff'd mem., 504 F.2d 271 
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); see also Recent Developments, supra 
note 2, at 1059-60 (such an argument "fails to distinguish secular humanism, as the term 
is used to describe our culture and institutions, and secular humanism as a philosophy 
or, according to the [Supreme Court,] a religion which holds that God is essentially irrel-
evant to man"). 
72. See Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also 
Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd 
per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). 
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of advancing religions, the establishment clause prohibits gov-
ernmental hostility or opposition toward religion.73 To remain 
neutral, the state must support only nonreligious or secular ef-
fects; it cannot favor one religious or irreligious view over an-
other. 7" Some claim that teaching evolution has antireligious ef-
fects. They point to its indoctrination in factsn that effectively 
leave the student no room to believe in supernatural or religious 
explanations.76 But evolutionary theory is not presented as in-
disputable dogma by the scientific community.77 It is a malleable 
theory, subject to modification.78 It attempts to correlate logi-
cally a catalog of empirical data into a cogent whole.79 If another 
theory were to explain more data than evolutionary theory, that 
new theory would take hold in the scientific community.80 No 
such alternative, however, has been posited.81 If teaching the 
most credible and unifying theories were considered to be an es-
tablishment violation whenever such scientific evidence contra-
73. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 222 (1963). 
74. See supra note 31. 
75. See Note, supra note 9, at 537 n.105 (evolution is taught in such a way as to 
"signify something tantamount to fact"); cf. L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 42 (when 
evolutionists call evolution a fact, they mean microevolution, when calling it a theory, 
they mean macroevolution). 
76. See, e.g., Bird, supra note 48, at 203-04 (arguing that exclusive presentation of 
evolution impairs religious beliefs). 
77. At least one college biology text is careful to note that evolution is a tentative 
theory. See LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 521; see also B. CAMPBELL, HUMAN EVOLU-
TION 1 (2d ed. 1974). This perception of "factual indoctrination" may stem from the 
sometimes unqualified presentation of evolution theory, but is more likely a result of the 
striking strength of evolution as a unifying theory of biology. Scientists do not want to 
imply that evolution is simply "an envisaged possibility, something uncertain and un-
proved." Note, supra note 9, at 537 n.105 (quoting E. KLINCKMANN, BIOLOGY TEACHERS' 
HANDBOOK 16 (2d ed. 1970)). It is evolution theory's ability to explain a great deal of 
biology that prompts occasional overstatements by scientists to the effect that it is a fact. 
See infra note 79. 
78. See, e.g., Research News, supra note 64 (reporting conference on improving evo-
lutionary explanations); Eigen, supra note 44, at 88 (explaining new developments in 
prebiotic explanations of evolution); Hodge, The Andromeda Galaxy, Sci. AM., Jan. 
1981, at 92 (explaining how distant galaxies can be used as "laboratories" for the study 
of the evolution of stars and galaxies); Wetherill, The Formation of the Earth from 
Planetesimals, Sc,. AM., June 1981, at 162 (presenting a theory on the accretion of plan-
etary mass which resulted in planets like the earth); Woese, Archaebacteria, id. at 98 
(discussing the evolution of cellular structure ·and function). 
79. See, e.g., LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 635 ("the modem version of Darwinism 
has been aligned so consistently with genetics, paleontology, systematics, and other 
branches of biology, that it must be regarded as one of the most firmly grounded and 
reliable explanatory systems in all science"); Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 236 ("The use-
fulness of the theory of evolution to explain and to organize empirical data cannot seri-
ously be questioned."). 
80. See supra note 59. 
81. See LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 653. 
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dieted some religious belief, science learning would be seriously 
impaired. 
Moreover, even if instruction in evolution inhibits creationist 
religions, it does so only in an incidental manner. The primary 
effect of teaching evolution is not repression of creationist reli-
gions, but enhanced knowledge of the scientific method. Teach-
ing evolution imparts a cogent empirical explanation of the ori-
gins and development of life on earth. Such instruction 
encourages skepticism of all scientific theories in order to main-
tain the vigor of scientific investigation. This scientific skepti-
cism may lead students to question nonnatural explanations as 
well; but any skepticism of religious beliefs is only an incidental 
by-product of scientific study and has never been the subject of 
establishment proscription. 82 
3. Entanglement- The prohibition against entanglement 
mandates that government not intrude pervasively into the reli-
gious arena, or vice versa.83 It is designed to minimize the divi-
siveness that often accompanies state interference in religious 
controversy, whether fiscal or doctrinal, and religious involve-
ment in state concerns. 84 This branch of the test, however, is 
relatively unimportant once the purpose and primary effect tests 
are met, and is normally applied only in cases involving financial 
support for religion.811 In fact, evolution's entanglement with re-
ligion arises only when critics inject religion into the debate over 
teaching the theory of evolution.88 There is no divisiveness 
among rf:!ligions or doctrinal disputes to be resolved by the 
courts, and no state interference with religion or fiscal support 
of any establishment-religion. Consequently, the theory of evolu-
tion presents no entanglement problem. 
82. See generally Goldberg, supra note 26, at 28 (noting that the intermittent ten-
sion between religion and science was constitutionally determined in favor of science). 
83. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971); Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); L. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 14-12, at 865. 
84. See Note, supra note 26, at 1164-65 n.12 (citing Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 74 
(D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
85. For this reason, some have complained that the entanglement test is superfluous. 
See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 769-70 (1976)(White, J., concur-
ring); L. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 14-12, at 865. Others criticize the "political divisiveness" 
language. See, e.g., Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entangle-
ment of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205, 
212 (1980). Nonetheless, the test continues to serve as a barrier to excessive governmen-
tal intervention, especially in doctrinal disputes, see, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 
(1979)(courts may not resolve church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine 
and practice), and governmental involvement in programs concerning religion, see, e.g., 
Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1687 (1982). 
86. Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 744 (1980). 
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In summary, teaching evolution in the public schools does not 
constitute an establishment of religion. This instruction has a 
manifest secular purpose, primary secular effects with only inci-
dental religious effects, and no impermissible entanglement. The 
next section discusses whether teaching evolution unconstitu-
tionally burdens the public school pupil's free exercise of 
religion. 
B. Evolution Theory and the Free Exercise Clause 
The free exercise clause of the first amendment prohibits the 
government from purposefully interfering· with religious beliefs 
and practices. 87 The state, therefore, cannot intentionally re-
strain public school students in their religious beliefs.88 Such re-
straint would unconstitutionally burden the student's right to 
the free exercise of religion. 
In order to make out a free exercise claim, the student or par-
ent must show that first, the belief burdened by the state action 
was religious; second, the state burdened that religious belief in 
a coercive fashion; and finally, the coercive burden was not out-
weighed by a countervailing state interest.89 Under this quasi-
balancing test, 90 the teaching of evolutionary theory does not 
87. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(Seventh-day Adventist who be-
lieves in a day of rest on Saturday may not be forced to work on that day to qualify for 
unemployment compensation); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)(oath affirming 
belief in God violates atheist belieO. 
88. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(Amish students compelled to 
attend school after the eighth grade are wholly unable to practice the separatist beliefs of 
their religion); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)(com-
pulsory flag salute forces student, against his religious conscience, to practice idolatry). 
89. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963); see also Note, supra note 9, at 518. 
90. Balancing tests in constitutional determinations are criticized for their ad hoc 
flavor, see, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 539 n.115, while bright-line tests and absolute 
rules are often condemned as inflexible or "wooden," Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
414 (1963)(Stewart, J., concurring); see also Note, The Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses: Conflict or Coordination?, 48 MINN. L. REv. 929, 930-933 (1964). The free exer-
cise cases reflect this ambivalence and sometimes sidestep any explicit balancing test. 
Compare Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)(state interest in a uniform day of rest 
is more important than the financial loss incurred by Orthodox Jews who are motivated 
by religious beliefs to close on Saturdays and barred by the state from opening on Sun-
days), with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(plaintiff's religious belief in Saturday 
rest is to be protected over state's desire to condition employment benefits on willingness 
to work on Saturdays). But in the end, balancing seems inevitable. See Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(Amish belief in separatism "overbalances" the admittedly 
strong state interest in compulsory education); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestab-
lishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1967); Le Clercq, 
supra note 9, at 227. 
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unconstitutionally burden the free exercise of beliefs held by 
most Biblical Creationists. 
1. Religious belief- In cases involving the establishment 
clause, "religion" must be defined narrowly to allow the govern-
ment freedom to act.91 In free exercise cases, however, the Su-
preme Court gives great weight to the believer's own characteri-
zation of the belief as religious;99 the principal judicial inquiry is 
whether the individual's belief occupies a meaningful place in 
his or her life " 'parallel to that filled [by] God' in traditionally 
religious persons. "93 
This broad definition for "free-exercise-religion," hinging as it 
does on subjective belief, embraces easily the beliefs of Biblical 
Creationists for Biblical Creationists proclaim emphatically the 
religious character of their beliefs. Specifically, they believe that 
the literal account of Genesis is true and that the Bible is iner-
rant. 94 Beliefs rooted in such a traditional religious text clearly 
fall within the ambit of the free exercise clause.911 
2. Coercive burden- State action which interferes in any 
way with an individual's freedom to pursue a free-exercise-relig-
ion is technically burdensome." To be unconstitutional, how-
91. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
92. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 
(1981); Galanter, supra note 42, at 266-67; Note, supra note 9, at 519 n.19; cf. Weiss, 
Privilege, Posture and Protection - "Religion in the Law", 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604 
(1964)(any attempt by a court to define religion "would seem to violate religious freedom 
in that it would dictate to religions, present and future what they must be"). 
93. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970)(quoting United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)). While these cases turned on statutory interpretations, they 
provide insight into the Court's view of religion in free-exercise-type cases: 
[A]ny sincere belief based on a power, being, or faith, upon which all else is 
ultimately dependent, could qualify as a religious belief or training. The Court 
avoided a theistic interpretation of religion and adopted a broader, more liberal 
standard, which focuses on the role that set of beliefs serves for an individual. 
Comment, Religious Activity, supra note 41, at 388 (footnotes omitted). While the stan-
dard is indeed a liberal one, the Court has not yet overruled its dictum in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder that mere "philosophical and personal" belief has no constitutional status. 406 
U.S. 205, 216 (1972). 
94. See Note, supra note 9, at 519-20. 
95. See Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 
(198l)("Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an 
unreasonable one."). Indeed, Fundamentalism qualifies easily under the more stringent 
standard for establishment-religion. See supra note 43. Fundamentalists are theistic, be-
lieve in a transcendent reality, propound absolute truths, and are well organized and well 
established historically. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 519-20 (citing the Articles 
of Faith for several creationist and Fundamentalist religions, including Seventh-day Ad-
ventists Apostolic Lutherans, Independent Baptists, and others). 
96. See Note, supra note 9, at 523-33 (outlining an extensive array of possible "bur-
dens" in the public school, including exposure to contrary beliefs and even peer 
pressure). 
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ever, the burden must be direct and coercive.97 Furthermore, 
merely being compelled to take certain actions will not sustain a 
first amendment challenge if there is no resulting coercion of be-
liefs, for only beliefs mandate absolute protection.98 
Biblical Creationists claim that the compulsory setting of the 
classroom, the mandatory training in evolution theory, and the 
absence of a counterbalancing model of creation combine to 
place a coercive burden on the free exercise of their religious be-
liefs. 99 Certainly there is a coercive aspect to compulsory class-
97. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)(upholding state act which did 
not force the complainant to abandon his religion, but merely made the exercise of his 
beliefs more expensive). A direct burden involves an irreconcilable conflict between the 
individual's religious tenets and obedience to the law, necessitating "either abandoning 
his religious practice or facing criminal prosecution." Id. at 605. In contrast, an indirect 
burden is imposed by an act "which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself," 
but places only an incidental, e.g., economic, hardship on the activity. Id. at 606; see 
Note, A Braunfeld v. Brown Test for Indirect Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 
48 MINN. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1964). 
The Court has softened the direct burden test to include compelled abandonment of 
belief in order to receive a public benefit. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). 
The test of "abandoning a religious practice," however, has been retained. The abandon-
ment showing is relatively high, and mere postponement in time or limited narrowing of 
opportunities to exercise religious beliefs would probably be considered indirect. In the 
case of creationist students complaining about evolution theory as a burden, the "com-
pelled abandonment of belier• showing is difficult to make. See infra note 101. 
98. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940)("[T]he [First] Amend-
ment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is abso-
lute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be."); cf. Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(j)(1976)(religious observance and practice pro-
tected as well as belieO. 
99. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 536-38, 541-43. Wendell Bird, the author of the 
cited student note, is now staff attorney for the Institute for Creation Research in San 
Diego, writing extensively on this subject from a creationist point of view. He is the 
author of the article cited supra note 48, as well as a drafter of the Arkansas Balanced 
Treatment Act. He has also intervened for the State of Louisiana in the litigation regard-
ing its balanced treatment act, Keith v. Louisiana Dep't of Educ., Civ. Act. 81-989 § B 
(M.D. La. filed Dec. 2, 1981); Aguillard v. Treen, Civ. Act. 81-4787 (E.D. La. filed Dec. 3, 
1981). See N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 4, at 19, col. 3 (midw. ed.). Mr. Bird claims the 
public school setting imposes a variety of restraints on a creationist child: undermining 
of creationist beliefs by inducing belief in incompatible views, i.e., evolution; violation of 
the separatist practices of creationists, especially religions such as the absolute separa-
tism of Apostolic Lutherans wishing to shun all worldly influences; and compulsion of 
unconscionable declarations of belief, e.g., test answers which affirm evolution. See Note, 
supra note 9, at 523-26. 
Mr. Bird also lists the allegedly coercive aspects of evolutionary instruction: compul-
sion through course prescription; penalization by unconstitutional condition, i.e., impos-
ing a choice between the free exercise rights and the benefit of public education in evolu-
tion classes (It is not clear that this "benefit" is even sought by creationists. See infra 
note 203 and accompanying text.); and influence and pressure from teachers and peers. 
See id. at 528-36. 
Each of these concerns is prompted by the undeniable fact that many creationist stu-
dents alter their religious beliefs while attending public schools. See id. at 537 n.107 
(citing K. HYDE, RELIGIOUS LEARNING IN ADOLESCENCE 44 (1965)). Contrary to Mr. Bird's 
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room instruction: the pedagogical process demands discipline 
and adherence to taught behavior patterns; the student is pres-
sured to conform class participation and test answers to the 
teacher's expectations. Yet this everyday pressure to conform is 
not the unconstitutionally coercive burden barred by the free ex-
ercise clause, except in cases where religion pervades nearly 
every apsect of the student's life.100 Thus, while students may 
find a given course or lesson offensive to their personal tastes or 
beliefs, the free exercise clause is not violated unless the entire 
setting of public education - the classes, the lessons, the 
"worldJiness" - is shown to be burdensome.101 
analysis, however, only the "unconscionable declaration of beliefs" on a test paper might 
qualify as a compelled act of affirmance on the part of the creationist student. Even this 
act is not equivalent to the wholesale abandonment of a religious tenet, which is the 
ultimate concern of the free exercise clause. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
404 (1963)("abandoning one of the precepts of her religion"). To suggest otherwise would 
lead to the conclusion that test questions concerning the history of the Soviet Union 
asked on a history test will induce belief in communism. See infra note 101 and accom-
panying text. 
100. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (19_72). 
101. Amish beliefs require members to pursue simple vocational lifestyles such as 
farming. In Yoder, the Amish objected to higher education in general because it tended 
to emphasize "intellectual and scientific accomplishment, self-distinction, competitive-
ness, worldly success, and social life with other students." 406 U.S. at 211. Such beliefs 
could not be accommodated within the traditional public school. See id. at 218. Whole-
sale exemption was the only constitutionally acceptable solution. 
The Supreme Court's free exercise pronouncements have never extended to mere ex-
posure to ideas contrary to religious belief except in the case of strict separatists like the 
Amish. See id. at 211. In Sherbert, the complainant had the choice either to abandon 
Saturday worship or be denied state unemployment compensation. 374 U.S. at 404, 406, 
410. In Torcaso, the complainant either had to swear to a belief in God or be barred from 
elective office. 367 U.S. at 495. In Thomas, petitioner could either abandon his pacifist 
religious beliefs or lose state benefits. 450 U.S. at 717. In none of these cases did the 
Court suggest that mere exposure to contrary ideas would suffice to prove a free exercise 
violation. 
The public school cases are somewhat more solicitous of "mere exposure." In Yoder, 
the students could either attend a school which contradicted all Amish beliefs or face 
legal sanctions. 406 U.S. at 211. In Barnette, the compelled flag salute offered the stu-
dent the unconstitutional choice of practicing idolatry by affirming belief in a "graven 
image," or facing disciplinary measures. 319 U.S. at 633-34. Still, in these cases the stu-
dent was being asked to profess belief, by word or act, in the contrary idea. This differs 
from the classroom pressure on creationists who are asked only to explain on a test paper 
about a theory of natural science, and not to profess to a personal belief. 
[l]n a science course the student is not forced to believe as true anything which 
he studies. If the student cannot accommodate his or her parents' religious views 
with the theory of evolution, as most students do, he is free to reject personally 
the theory of evolution for whatever reasons he wishes since the right to believe 
or think is absolutely protected under the first amendment. 
Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 230 n.132; cf. Kalven, supra note 13, at 520 n.39 ("A strong 
case can be made that even religious beliefs are strengthened by exposure to c~unter-
doctrine. The classical analysis is found in Mill's essay on Liberty where he defended 
freedom to argue against belief in Christian ethics and morality on these grpunds."). 
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Moreover, merely showing that evolutionary theory exerts an 
influence on religious beliefs cannot support a constitutional 
complaint.102 Many school subjects influence religious beliefs or 
ethics; sex education, the life sciences, government, literature, as 
well as history and comparative religion classes often raise 
thorny issues impinging on religious beliefs.108 This influence, 
however, is not considered unconstitutionally coercive. 104 
Finally, students exposed to the theory of evolution are 
neither forced nor encouraged to abandon religious beliefs. If the 
scientific method is properly presented, the student will realize 
that science limits itself to analysis of empirical data•oa and 
avoids discussion of ultimate values or primary causes.108 Thus 
understood, even compelling a test answer on evolutionary the-
ory is not coercive of religious belief, but only a neutral act in 
science education. 
For the vast majority of creationists, mere exposure to contra-
dictory beliefs is insufficient to demonstrate unconstitutional co-
ercion.107 In some cases, however, even this exclusively secular 
exposure may lead to abandonment of sincerely held creationist 
beliefs. A religion may demand a lifestyle cut off from much of 
the modern world.108 Exposure to an alternative to the six-day 
Creation may coercively burden the free exercise of students be-
longing to such a religion. For these students, hereinafter re-
102. Indeed, the student's religious beliefs are vulnerable to evolutionary theory's in-
fluence for only a short time; usually less than 15 classroom hours per year are spent on 
evolution lessons. See Note, supra note 9, at 564-65 n.241. This limited exposure to 
evolution theory is hardly the kind or degree of burden placed on someone wholly inca-
pable of exercising their belief without government cooperation, e.g., prisoners or mili-
tary personnel. See Figinski, supra note 29, at 406-16. Nor is it comparable to the con-
stant assault on religious beliefs suffered by the Amish through mere exposure to the 
secular world. See supra note 101. With schoolchildren, church and parent have exten-
sive opportunity outside school to present a full account of creationism and rebut the 
theory of evolution. 
103. See Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 883-85. 
104. Compare Recent Developments, supra note 2, at 1056-59 (mere social pressure 
and exposure without direct governmental compulsion does not amount to unconstitu-
tional coercion), with Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 914 (many classroom settings provide 
value clashes for students, but only very limited free exercise exemptions are allowable if 
the state is to achieve its goals). 
105. See supra note 44. 
106. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
107. See Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 230. 
108. The Amish provide the most well-known example of absolute separatist prac-
tices. The Amish do not collect unemployment, welfare benefits, or buy insurance; they 
strive to maintain a completely self-contained and independent community. See The 
Amish and the Law, TIME, Apr. 19, 1982, at 12. The Amish do not wish their children to 
be exposed to worldly influences and so take their children out of public school at a 
relatively early age. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). 
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ferred to as "strict" creationists, mere exposure to alternative 
theories becomes arguably coercive and therefore unconstitu-
tional. 109 Part II discusses how these students may obtain relief 
from this coercive burden. 
3. Adequate state interest- Even though the state's action 
constitutes a coercive burden, it may be justified as serving a 
valid state interest. The coercive burden is justified, however, 
only if the state interest cannot be "otherwise served."110 That 
is, the state must show that no alternative means of achieving its 
objective avoid coercively burdening religious free exercise. m 
It is well settled that the state has a strong interest in public • 
education. 112 The state interest in teaching natural sciences such 
as biology is also undeniably great. 118 The state cannot pursue 
this interest without teaching those theories which are well ac-
cepted by natural scientists. Virtually all natural scientists be-
lieve the theory of evolution is the proper explanation of the 
earth's development.114 Moreover, evolutionary theory is consid-
ered central to natural science explanations1115 and is customarily 
taught in biology, geology, and astronomy courses.116 Conse-
109. It is important to distinguish "strict" separatist creationists from other creation-
ists because the religious beliefs of "strict" separatists are more extensively contradicted 
by the public school environment. Consequently, coercive burdens are more likely to oc-
cur. One example of Biblical Creationist strict separatism is the Apostolic Lutheran 
faith; its believers are forbidden to watch movies, watch television, listen to the radio, 
sing or dance to worldly music, or study evolution or "humanist" philosophy. See Davis 
v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.N.H. 1973); see also Note, supra note 9, at 524 n.43. 
Such a scrupulous separatism is probably burdened by mere exposure to evolution les-
sons. See Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 230; Note, supra note 9, at 564 n.239. 
110. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
111. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); see also Note, supra note 9, at 
542. Of course, the state can always alleviate such burdens by allowing exemptions from 
the state regulation. In Sherbert, for instance, the finding that there were less burden-
some ways to achieve desired ends did not mean the e,;isting regulation had to be struck 
down, only that the complainant could no longer be subject to its provisions. 374 U.S. at 
410. 
112. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 (public education ranks "at the very 
apex of a state"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)("education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local governments"). 
113. Virtually every American high school offers a biology course. See Note, supra 
note 9, at 536 n.101. Some states require schools to do so. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 3313.60 (Page 1972). Biology has become an increasingly important course, both to 
explain rapid changes in biological innovation such as DNA research and genetic engi-
neering, and also because many students need biology in order to attend college in 
technical fields. See, e.g., Sears, The Importance of Biology Teaching for Secondary 
School Pupils, 38 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 14 (1976), reprinted from 1 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 67 
(1939). 
114. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at 22, col. 1 (midw. ed.). 
115. See Hurd, supra note 66, at 391. 
116. The theory of evolution is central to and interwoven throughout all major biol-
ogy texts used in American high schools. See Note, supra note 9, at 537 n.1Q4 (citing E. 
446 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:2 
quently, if the state is to further effectively its interest in 
presenting natural science in public schools, it must present the 
theory of evolution, for no less burdensome curriculum is availa-
ble. This does not mean that no remedy exists under the free 
exercise clause for strict creationists.117 It simply means that 
teaching evolutionary theory objectively118 is constitutionally 
permissible. 
In summary, the dual religion dauses of the first amendment 
serve as constant monitors for religious freedom in public 
schools. Public school presentation of evolutionary theory meets 
0 these tests; no establishment clause violation is found, and the 
free exercise burden is limited to "strict" creationists. Conse-
quently, these "strict" creationists may warrant constitutional 
relief; but the religion clauses warrant no relief for other crea-
tionists. For non-"strict" creationists, statutory remedies may 
off er a solution, but these solutions themselves will need testing 
against the establishment clause. The various forms of relief 
available to creationists are discussed in part II. 
II. OBTAINING RELIEF FROM TEACHING THE THEORY OF 
EVOLUTION 
Several factors determine the choice of relief: whether the f o-
rum in which relief is being sought is judicial or legislative; 
whether the complained-of activity demands constitutional re-
lief; and if so, which religion clause is at issue. Judicial relief is 
more limited than legislative relief. Courts cannot act without 
finding a constitutional or statutory violation; no such restric-
tion constrains legislative initiative. 119 Courts often are unable to 
KLINCKMANN, BIOLOGY TEACHER'S HANDBOOK 16 (2d ed. 1970); Lee, The BSCS Position 
on the Teaching of Biology, BSCS NEWSLE'ITER, Nov. 1972, at 5). This fact was reiter-
ated by the court in McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. 
Ark. 1982). See generally LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 500-21. 
117. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. 
118. Improper presentation of the theory of evolution could, of course, trigger the 
religion clauses. Dogmatic or evangelistic presentations must be eschewed. See infra 
notes 189-90 and accompanying text. 
119. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
507 (1969)(affirming the "comprehensive authority" of state nonjudicial bodies to control 
schools, as long as they act "consistent[ly] with fundamental constitutional safeguards"). 
Legislatures thus remain subject to judicial scrutiny. Id. Nevertheless, though legisla-
tures may not pass on the ultimate constitutionality of state action, they may make a 
"finding" of unconstitutionality and provide legislative relief. The conscientious objector 
cases teach that Congress may choose to allow relief for those opposing war on religious 
grounds though no constitutional relief is otherwise warranted. See, e.g., Welsh v. United 
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fashion comprehensive relief; integrated and holistic solutions 
are the legislature's specialty.120 Legislatures and school boards, 
therefore, direct their efforts toward structuring course content 
and rarely grant students exemptions from class or proscribe 
areas from the curriculum. 121 The courts, on the other hand, fo-
cus more on exemptions and proscriptions, finding prescription 
of course content beyond their expertise and power.m 
The form of relief available will also depend upon whether a 
constitutional provision has been violated. For instance, if the 
activity violates the establishment clause, elimination will be 
necessary; the absolute proscription of the establishment clause 
demands that no vestige of the violative material remain. 128 If 
the violation is a free exercise burden, personal exemption is the 
only relief available; it allows continuation of the state program 
yet simultaneously provides relief to the complainant.124 If, how-
ever, the courts find no constitutional violation, relief is limited 
to legislative action, action which must itself pass the establish-
ment clause test. Because public school presentation of evolu-
tionary theory was found not to violate the religious free exercise 
of most creationists and does not establish religion, relief must 
be nonjudicial. These non-constitutional statutory remedies are 
taken up first. 
The most recent and controversial legislative remedy for expo-
sure to the theory of evolution is "balanced treatment." This 
remedy attempts to "neutralize" by legislation the potentially 
antireligious impact of evolution instruction by adding to the 
curriculum a counterbalancing lesson1211 - usually a lesson in 
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)(exemption from selective service is statutory not constitu-
tional); United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931)(relief from military service 
is a permissive accommodation not a constitutional right). 
120. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)(actual desegregation solutions 
lie in the hands of school officials, though courts retain oversight jurisdiction and some 
equitable power). 
121. See Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 893-97, 942-52 .. 
122. See, e.g., Wright v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. 
Tex. 1972)(c<iurts are "hardly qualified to select from among the available theories those 
which merit attention in a public school biology class"), aff'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). 
123. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963). 
124. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. 
125. See Note, supra note 9, at 550 ("Public school instruction found to abridge free 
exercise of religion can be neutralized by incorporation of countervailing viewpoints."). 
But see McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1274 (E.D. Ark. 1982) 
(finding no legal merit in this approach). The McLean court correctly concluded that if 
teaching the.theory of evolution is somehow religious in an establishment clause sense, it 
must be eliminated outright, for no amount of counterteaching can undo the violation. 
See id. But teaching evolutionary theory is not an establishment of religion. Id.; see 
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what is known as "scientific creationism."128 Creationists advo-
cate balanced treatment for evolution and scientific creationism, 
claiming that any impermissible religiosity involved in teaching 
either lesson is "neutralized" by their joint presentation. 117 Be-
cause scientific creationism fails to pass the establishment clause 
test, however, a balanced treatment act which uses the scientific 
creation model is unconstitutional. 
A. Balanced Treatment with Scientific Creationism 
The classroom is a "mini-marketplace of ideas."lll8 The 
teacher should encourage a lively interchange of conflicting ideas 
well supported by the academic community and pertinent to the 
course of study promoted by the state. Interchange of ideas is 
fostered by expanding the scope of classroom presentations, es-
pecially in controversial areas likely to become one-sided or dog-
matic.129 Consequently, a "balanced treatment" act should ad-
dress matters in current dispute so that the student will not 
receive the distorted view that the issue is settled. Many areas of 
study provoke substantial disagreement - including history and 
political science,180 philosophy,181 and comparative religion.181 
supra notes 26-86 and accompanying text. If presentation of evolutionary theory 
presents free exercise coercion, continued exposure to evolution remains violative 
whether or not the school imports a "counterbalancing" theory to offset the burden. This 
"innoculation" approach, therefore, is unpersuasive, and complainants seeking constitu-
tional relief are limited to elimination or exemption. This Note does not consider bal-
anced treatment-neutralization as a possible judicial remedy in view of the judiciary's 
inability to design sufficiently thorough curriculum guidelines, see supra note 122, and 
because of the unprecedented nature of such relief, see Note, supra note 9, at 550-51 
(proposal for neutralization unsupported by legal precedent). 
126. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
127. See Note, supra note 9, at 550; Bird, supra note 48, at 168. 
128. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 
(1969)(citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
129. Kalven, supra note 13, at 520. 
130. For instance, certain history texts written after the Civil War were zealously 
pro-Union. Resulting protests prompted publishers to issue regional versions of the texts. 
R.F. CAMPBELL, L. CUNNINGHAM, R. NYSTRAND & M. UsDAN, THE ORGANIZATION AND CON-
TROL OF THE SCHOOLS 325 (3d ed. 1975); see also Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 874 n.8. 
Today a state might wish to promote the accurate portrayal of women or minorities in 
American history lessons by mandating the use of more balanced texts or the use of 
feminist historiographies. See, e.g., J. FRIEDMAN & W. SHADE, OUR AMERICAN SISTERS: 
WOMEN IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT 1 (2d ed. 1977). Some states require instruction 
in American government and other political systems in order to illustrate the advantages 
of the American system. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 545(l)(Supp. 1973)(instruction about 
communism must be given for the purpose of "instilling in the minds of students a 
greater appreciation of democratic process, freedom under law, and the will to preserve 
that freedom"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.064 (West Supp. 1976)(courses in "Americanism 
versus Communism" required); see also Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 883. 
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Balanced treatment might be considered appropriate in such 
fields. 
Balanced treatment might also be desirable in scientific sub-
jects when one position has become unjustifiably dogmatic. 11• 
The counterbalancing arms of the balanced treatment, however, 
must each be secular; otherwise, the program would violate the 
establishment clause. Consequently, scientific creationism, un-
less free from religious motivation and effects, is an un_accept-
able subject for balanced treatment. Although proponents of the 
scientific creation model proclaim its secular character,184 close 
scrutiny reveals their arguments to be without merit. 
1. Development of the balanced treatment by scientific cre-
ationism alternative- Fundamentalists have assailed Darwin's 
131. See Note, supra note 9, at 551 (suggesting that if a philosophy course were to 
address the subject of the existence of God in a nonreligious context using only theists, 
incorporation of the study of atheists might neutralize the course). 
132. Comparative religion courses offer perhaps the only acceptable forum for public 
school presentation of alternate religious beliefs and practice. Yet even here great care 
must be exercised to avoid doctrinaire or biased presentation which might contravene 
the establishment prohibition. Classes discussing the Bible or other religious material 
must be presented, if at all, "objectively as part of a secular program of education." 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); accord Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97, 106 (1968); see also infra text accompanying notes 191-93; Le Clercq, supra note 
9, at 219. One commentator, however, writes: 
The inherent problem with teaching about religion in the primary grades is that 
the students may be too intellectually immature and unsophisticated to differen-
tiate the literary and historical aspects of the Bible from its religious dogma. 
"Reading the Bible to students in the lower grades, who are not mature enough 
to comprehend the literary or historical values of it seldom can be other than a 
devotional exercise .... " 
Recent Developments, Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Establishment 
Clause - Bible Study in the Public Schools, Wiley v. Board of Education, 468 F. Supp. 
133 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), 47 TENN. L. REv. 181, 195 (1979) (citing Casad, On Teaching 
Religion at the State University, 12 U. KAN. L. REv. 405, 411 (1964)). 
133. A pertinent comparison can be made with the medieval Catholic Church ban on 
all discussion of the Copernican theory of heliocentricity. See supra note 57. A similar 
prejudice today might be subject to balancing. In the Soviet Union, for example, the 
head of the science establishment, Trofim Lysenko, for many years enforced by fiat the 
view that evolution was not an acceptable explanation of biological development. See Y. 
CRIPPS, CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY 4 (1980)(Lysenko opposed Darwinism on grounds that 
it inhibited the ideological training of young Soviets). If a similarly one-sided and abso-
lute view were to prevail in some state the legislature might feel the need to redress the 
balance. A similar situation is quite unlikely to occur in modem America, however, where 
many scientists constantly attack and improve current theories. See supra notes 59, 62-
65 & 78. 
134. Note, supra note 9, at 517: "[T]he conflict is not between science and religion, 
but between two theoretical models that build upon scientific observation and criticism 
and that harmonize with some religions and have overtones contrary to others." But cf. 
J. CAMPBELL, MYTHS To LIVE Bv 90 (Bantam ed. 1973)(conflict between science and Bi-
ble-based religion is actually conflict between two sciences: "that of 4000 B.C. and that 
of A.O. 2000"). 
450 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:2 
theory since it was first proposed, finding it repugnant to their 
faith in Genesis, 181 the biblical account of Creation. Their at-
tempts to prohibit the teaching of evolutionary theory, however, 
were found to be religiously motivated, 188 and the alternative of 
teaching Biblical Creationism along with evolution was found to 
promote establishment-religion.187 A less sectarian theory was 
clearly necessary if evolution was to be countered by a creation 
scenario. 
Consequently, creationists established research centers to find 
evidence to fortify creation scenarios or undermine evolution.188 
These efforts culminated in the theory of "scientific" creation-
ism.189 Its proponents claim that scientific creationism is consti-
tutionally distinguishable from Biblical Creationism because of 
its omission of biblical references and focus on scientific argu-
ment. 14° For instance, scientific creationism makes no reference 
to the six Creation days, Adam and Eve, Noah, or any other ex-
plicit biblical passage. Rather, the scientific creation "model" 
postulates a recent origin of the universe, including man; a 
worldwide catastrophic flood which buried almost all known life; 
135. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 9, at 519-22 
(examining the many creationist religions opposed to evolution); McLean v. Arkansas 
Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-59 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Fundamentalist efforts effec-
tively suppressed the teaching of evolutionary theory in schools until the early 1960's. Id. 
at 1259; Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 209~(citing findings that fewer than one-half of 
American high school biology teachers taught evolution during this time). 
Fundamentalist efforts were overcome when the 1957 Sputnik launch spurred massive 
infusions of money for the revision of science texts. L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 21. 
These revised texts, developed by the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study ("BSCS"), 
rely heavily on the theory of evolution as a comprehensive explanation for biological 
developments. Presently, 50% of American high school students use BSCS texts, and 
virtually all other texts are influenced by this approach. See Note, supra note 9, at 521 
n.25. 
136. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1968). Soon after Epperson, Missis-
sippi repealed the last of the state anti-evolution laws. L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 22; 
see supra note 13. 
137. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
138. The McLean court listed several Fundamentalist organizations formed to pro-
mote the idea that the Book of Genesis was supported by scientific data: Institute for 
Creation Research ("ICR")(affiliated with the Christian Heritage College, supported by 
the Scott Memorial Baptist Church in San Diego, California, and publishing as Creation-
Life Publishing Company, the largest publisher of creationist material); Creation Science 
Research Center ("CSRC")(San Diego-based); Bible Science Association ("BSA") (Min-
neapolis, Minnesota); Creation Research Society ("CRS")(an organization of literal Fun-
damentalists with master's degrees in a scientific field). McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of 
Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259-60 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Notably, the CSRC, concerned about 
an overly scientific bent to CRS activities, split from CRS in 1970 in order to promote a 
more Bible-oriented creationism. Id. 
139. Id. at 1259; Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 210 (describing the rise of the creationist 
associations and the increasingly scientific orientation of many creati~nists). 
140. See SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 3; Note, supra note 9, at 517. 
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and the constancy of life "kinds. "141 These proposals are coun-
terpoints to certain evolutionary tenets, viz., a multi-billion-year 
development of the universe, with man's emergence in the recent 
tens to hundreds of thousands of years; uniform change in the 
earth's geology and fossilization; and evolution and natural se-
lection of species. m 
Scientific creationists hope to employ balanced treatment to 
"undogmatize" the present exclusive presentation of evolution-
ary theory and to neutralize the perceived religious impact of 
evolution instruction. 148 While the recent decision in McLean v. 
Arkansas Board of Education14" casts doubt on the future of 
these efforts, other states continue to pass balanced treatment 
laws. 1411 Moreover, a popular majority in many places apparently 
favor balanced treatment of evolution theory and creationism in 
public schools.146 The next section discusses whether the teach-
ing of scientific creationism in public schools is constitutionally 
permissible. 
2. Scientific creationism and the establishment clause-
Creationists concede that teaching Biblical Creationism in the 
public schools is an establishment violation.147 Whether scien-
tific creationism can clear the hurdles which blocked its prede-
cessor is a question of religious purpose and effects. 
a. Secular purpose- The establishment clause prohibits any 
state action intended to advance or inhibit religion.148 Courts 
will strike down a purportedly secular state act on establishment 
grounds if the actual intent of its proponents is religious.149 
141. See supra note 15. 
142. See supra note 8. 
143. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 14; see also Note, supra note 
9, at 551. This movement prompted the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act. See McLean 
v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1262. 
144. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
145. See Balanced Treatment for Creation,Science and Evolution-Science Act, LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1 to .7 (West Supp. 1982); see also S. 2256 (Miss. 1981)(not 
passed by Miss. House). 
146. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 4, at 19, col. 1 (midw. ed.)("[l]n many rural 
school districts, creationism is still taught routinely, since that is the wish of the school 
board and the majority of the community."); see also Comment, supra note 3, at 446 
(two-thirds of Nebraska teachers polled present Divine Creation in class). The McLean 
court accepted the findings of recent polls indicating that a majority of Americans are 
not opposed to presentation of creationism along with evolution. The Court dismissed 
this finding as not relevant to the constitutional question. 529 F. Supp. at 1274. 
147. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 553-54; SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, 
at 3; see also supra note 14. 
148. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
149. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)(per curiam). 
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Many proponents of the balanced treatment of evolution and 
scientific creationism, including some of the legislative sponsors 
of evolution-creation balanced treatment acts, work to further 
the religious aspects of creationism1110 and protect scientific crea-
tionist beliefs from attack by lessons on evolution or other theo-
ries concerning the origin of life. m Indeed, the motivation of 
those proposing the teaching of scientific creationism seems 
identical to the motivation of those who earlier advocated Bibli-
cal Creationism. In most respects, scientific creationism is indis-
tinguishable from the Genesis account of Creation, and virtually 
all scientific creationists believe in Biblical Creationism. 1111 Thus, 
there is ample proof of an impermissible religious purpose and 
motivation behind the evolution-creation balanced treatment 
acts.1113 
150. The McLean court found that the "creationist organizations consider the intro-
duction of creation science into the public schools part of their ministry." 529 F. Supp. 
at 1260. For instance, creationists in Arkansas organized political lobbying efforts in or-
der to get the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act passed. A local group of ministers 
adopted a resolution supporting the Act, appointed two of their members to implement 
the resolution by lobbying, and prevailed upon a local state senator to guide the Act 
through an uninformed state legislature. Id. at 1262. The court also found that the 
drafter of the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act was on a "religious crusade" to inject 
creationism into the schools, id. at 1261, and that the legislative sponsor of the bill was 
"motivated solely by his religious beliefs and desire to see the Biblical version of creation 
taught in the public schools," id. at 1263. The same religious fervor is evident in the 
authors of scientific creationist texts. See, e.g., Barnes, Foreword, in H. MORRIS, supra 
note 12, at 4 ("It is the burning desire in Dr. Morris' life that all may have the opportu-
nity to hear this and be brought to a knowledge of the historicity of the Scriptures, and 
of course to a faith in the true God of Creation."). 
151. Scientific creationists sometimes assert that there are basically two viewpoints of 
origins, i.e., evolution and "the doctrine of special creation," though "several variants of 
each have been developed." BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY, supra note 
53, at xvii. This is partially accurate in that supporters of evolution attempt to utilize 
only naturalistic explanations, while creationists rely to some extent on non-natural ex-
planations. But lumping together all the versions of origins does violence to the beliefs of 
many non-scientific creationists. See Wright v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 366 F. 
Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972)("1f the beliefs of fundamentalism were the sole alter-
native to the Darwinian theory, equal time might at least be feasible. But virtually every 
religion known to man holds its own peculiar views of human origins."), aff'd per curiam, 
486 F:2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); L. THURMAN, supra note 
8, at 40, 115 (noting the existence of at least six versions of creation, each one "scientifi-
cally or theologically possible, although each one also has certain weaknesses"). But see 
Sc1ENTll'IC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 215-55 (analyzing each of the creation theories 
besides scientific creationism and dismissing each as scientifically impossible and theo-
logically unfounded). 
152. Applicants for one major scientific creati<mist organization must subscribe to a 
statement of belief which includes literal belief in Genesis and other Biblical Creationist 
tenets. See id. at 1260 n.7. The author of the definitive text on scientific creationism, see 
SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, is an avowed Biblical Creationist. See H. MOR-
RIS, supra note 12, at 4. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 558 n.210. 
153. See, e.g., McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1264. 
WINTER 1982) Religion Clauses 453 
Reliance on the intent of the sponsors and supporters of scien-
tific creationism, however, is a shifting basis for a constitutional 
determination. If the religious purpose should eventually dissi-
pate, the basis for the decision would evaporate as well. The pri-
mary effect test thus offers a more solid basis for decision. 
b. Primary effects- To be acceptable constitutionally, a 
state act may not have as its principal or primary effect the ad-
vancement or inhibition of religion; any such effect must be no 
more than an incidental side effect which merely harmonizes 
with religious or irreligious beliefs. 11" Scientific creationism does 
more than harmonize with the biblical account of Genesis - it 
is virtually indistinguishable from it. 11111 Scientific creationism 
unavoidably implies biblical personages and explanations. For 
instance, though the scientific creationist theory of "catastro-
phism"1118 makes no reference to Noah and his Ark, it clearly 
suggests the biblical story. The scientific creationist account sug-
gests that human beings and animals could have survived the 
flood only by riding it out in some sort of watertight vessel. 1117 
The primary effect, both actual and intended, is to present 
Noah's Ark as a scientifically necessary and historically accurate 
explanation for the continuation of man and all living things fol-
lowing such a catastrophe. Any student with the least exposure 
to the story of Noah in the Bible will immediately recognize this 
"coincidence." The actual effect of that lesson is thus impermis-
sibly religious. 
Nor is this religious effect incidental. Portions of the scientific 
154. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
155. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1265. 
156. Catastrophism is the scientific creationist theory that a worldwide flood, perhaps 
three miles deep, caused most of the major geological changes on earth. See SCIENTIFIC 
CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 91-130. The public school edition of this textbook on 
creationism scrupulously avoids any exact reference to the Bible, or to specifics such as 
the date or height of the flood. See id. at 117; see also id. at iv (explaining that the 
general edition and public school edition are the same, but for a chapter on "Creation 
According to Scripture" in the former). 
157. Noah is not discussed explicitly in the general edition of Scientific Creationism 
outside of the last chapter on Scripture. Transparent language, however, is used to ex-
plain how life survived the Deluge: 
Sooner or later all land animals would perish. Many, but not all marine ani-
mals would perish. Human beings would swim, run, climb, and attempt to es-
cape the floods but, unless a few managed to ride out the cataclysm in unusu-
ally strong watertight sea-going vessels they would eventually all drown or 
otherwise perish. 
Id. at 117 (emphasis added). This hardly oblique reference is explained in the last chap-
ter as being the story of Noah and his Ark. Id. at 253. Even without the biblical citation 
at the end, this explanation conveys "an inescapable religiosity." McLean, 529 F. Supp. 
at 1265. 
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creation model - such as catastrophism - go beyond mere har-
mony with religion. Because this "scientific" model so closely 
parallels the biblical account, it imparts science's aura of empiri-
cal certainty to a specific religious story. This religious effect is 
its primary, indeed sole effect. In this respect it can be distin-
guished from state action which has other significant nonreli-
gious consequences, for instance, a Sunday-closing statute, 
which only incidentally advances or inhibits Saturday wor-
ship. 1118 Scientific creationism does not promote scientific under-
standing; it serves only to fortify the literal message of 
Genesis. 1119 
It would be, however, unnecessarily hostile to religion to ban 
all biblical data merely because of its source. If biblical informa-
tion or data could be independently verified, the religious source 
of the original information would not make it objectionable. 
Many creationists believe that the Bible is not only historically 
accurate but also scientifically correct. 180 The scientific merit in 
the scientific creationist theory, or "model,"161 however, is mea-
ger. The model's explanation of origins is empirically unverifi-
able, cannot be experimentally tested, and is not subject to re-
finement or change. 162 
Most significantly, though, scientific creationism goes beyond 
the bounds of any scientific approach by suggesting that nature's 
"design" or "direction" infers a purposeful designer.168 Indeed, 
scientific creationism relies on many non-natural and external 
158. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
159. Scientists have characterized scientific creationism as "forced imposition of reli-
gious doctrine, disguised as science, into the science textbooks." Mayer, supra note 59, at 
415. It has also been called the "smuggling of religious dogma into classrooms in a scien-
tific Trojan horse." Mayer, Creationism: A Masquerade, 36 AM. BIOLOGY TcHR. 245, 246 
(1974); cf. Goldberg, supra note 26, at 28 n.182 ("The establishment of religion clause 
cannot be evaded simply by asserting that a given government-supported program is 
'science' rather than religion."). 
160. See, e.g., J. MooRE, supra note 11, at 10. 
161. Creationists use the term "model" or "theory" interchangeably, but in a sense 
entirely different from its use by evolutionary scientists. See Mayer, supra note 59, at 
412; see also McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1269 ("A theory that is by its own terms dogmatic, 
absolutist and never subject to revision is not a scientific theory."). 
162. Creationists concede that scientific creationism is not subject to the scientific 
method. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 5; see also H. MORRIS, supra 
note 12, at 80-81. Some creationists are even willing to admit to the religious nature of 
scientific creationism. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1268 (citing D. G1sH, EvoumoN? 
THE Foss1Ls SAY No! 42 (3d ed. 1979)). 
163. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 33, 35 ("The creation model 
does include, quite explicitly, the concept of purpose. The Creator was purposive, not 
capricious or indifferent, as He planned and then created the universe .... " "The crea-
tionist explanation . . . gives assurance that there is real meaning and eternal purpose to 
existence."); see also BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY, supra note 53, at 12. 
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explanations which are eschewed by the natural scientist. 1414 For 
instance, scientific creationism, ostensibly divorced from all bib-
lical references, relies fundamentally on an element.which is reli-
gious under any analysis - the existence of a Creator.1611 Crea-
tionists respond to this criticism by pointing out that the 
government makes frequent reference to God in its publications 
and deliberations.188 Such references, however are ancillary to 
the content of these publications and deliberations; deleting 
these references would not affect significantly the content. De-
leting the references to the "creator" in scientific creationist 
texts, on the other hand, would effectively vitiate the presenta-
tion. The pervasive reference to and essential reliance upon an 
external Supreme Cause and Controller manifest in the scientific 
creationist literature makes the model undeniably religious. 187 A 
Supreme Cause is the philosophical base of all theism, whether 
biblically based or not. Explanations that rely on _external non-
natural causes are not science: they bear the unmistakable 
markings of an establishment-religion.188 
c. Entanglement- The entanglement prohibition bars fis-
164. See Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.209. 
165. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)("The term 'religion' has reference 
to one's views of his relations to his Creator .... "); see also Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. 
Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977)("[C]oncepts concerning ... a supreme being of some 
sort are manifestly religious . . . . These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely 
because they are presented as a philosophy or as a science."), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 
197 (3d Cir. 1979). Creationist· texts are filled with references to a Creator or God. See, 
e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14 (chapters intended for public school use refer 
to a creator more than 15 times, to God at least a half-dozen times); BIOLOGY: A SEARCH 
FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY, supra note 53 ("Creator," 19 times; "God," 25 times; Bible 
personages, 10 times). See generally Note, supra note 9, at 560 n.220. 
166. See Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.208. 
167. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1265-66 (E.D. Ark. 
1982). 
168. Some creationists are willing to admit that creationism is theistic and even a 
literal reading of Genesis, but feel that presentation of the creation model in public 
schools remains acceptable. See, e.g., McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1266 ("teaching the exis-
tence of God is not religious unless the teaching seeks a commitment")(citing testimony 
of Dr. Norman Geisler). One commentator has remarked: 
I assure my students when I explain the creation model and evolution model 
of first origins that class work will not involve religion. By this I mean that no 
worship will be involved in class, no special conduct or ritual will be followed; 
that is, no prayer beads or prayer rug will be used, no facing the east, or wor-
shipful conduct or ritual will be practiced. Hence no religion is involved in my 
classes. 
J. MOORE, supra note 11, at 88.·The District Court in McLean correctly dismissed this 
creationist definition of religion because it "is contrary to common understanding and 
contradicts settled case law." 529 F. Supp. at 1266 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 
(1980)(per curiam); School Dist .. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)). 
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cal169 and doctrinal involvement with religion.170 While the en-
tanglement test is relatively unimportant once religious purpose 
and primary effect are found, 171 it may provide an additional 
ground for decision in close cases. Creationists argue that the 
scientific evidence for creation is doctrinally separable from the 
religious evidence and that the two can be kept separate.171 But 
to allow the presentation of scientific evidence for creation en-
tangles the state in the doctrinal segregation of "religious" crea-
tion and "scientific" creation evidence. The school board would 
assume the very role the entanglement doctrine prohibits - ex-
tensive involvement in religious controversy178 - if it were to 
conduct extensive monitoring to keep religion out of creationism 
lessons. This doctrinal involvement is especially acute when 
school boards are faced with at least six creation versions.174 The 
school may, of course, present evidence against evolution that 
does not support a creation model. 
In conclusion, scientific creationism fails to fulfill its purport-
edly secular promise. In purpose and effect it advances funda-
mentalist religions and engenders an extensive governmental en-
tanglement with religious issues. Mandating instruction in 
scientific creationism - even as part of a balanced treatment 
program - is an establishment of religion. Creationists must 
pursue relief in other forms. 
169. Because scientific creationism is religion, the state sponsorship of creationist 
literature or provision of class time for creationist teachings is impermissible entangle-
ment. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1272. Private donation of the schoolbooks might 
ameliorate that entanglement. Classroom presentation, however, remains an impermis-
sible fiscal entanglement. Id. 
170. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
172. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1265-66. Since passage of the Arkansas Balanced 
Treatment Act, creationists have focused on the less religious aspects of scientific crea-
tionism and have attempted to sever some of the portions of the theory which are too 
closely aligned with the Bible. See Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act, LA. R.Ev. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 17:286.1 to .7 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1982, § 4, at 19, col. 1 
(midw. ed.). In addition, the expositions in creationist texts are becoming less religious 
and increasingly more sophisticated and "scientific". See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, 
supra note 14 (a high school creationist text which includes relatively technical discus-
sions of thermodynamics and radiometric dating). 
173. Cf. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)(civil courts may 
not resolve church disputes on the basis of religious doctrine); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. 
Supp. 133 (E.D. Tenn.), enforced mem., 474 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Tenn. 1979)(describing 
with particularity the portions of the Bible which could be presented in public school in 
an objective, secular fashion). 
174. See L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 40. 
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B. Eliminating Evolution from School Curricula 
Elimination of a school lesson is the most drastic method of 
relief. It is appropriate only when the complained-of activity vio-
lates the establishment clause and a less compehensive remedy 
would leave the violative act intact. na Elimination is an inappro-
priate remedy in free exercise cases, because in such cases ex-
empting the burdened student will suffice.178 Moreover, elimi-
nating the arguably burdensome instruction would be an 
overinclusive remedy in free exercise cases, because it would de-
prive many students of an important educational experience in 
order to unburden the religious beliefs of a few. 177 
Elimination of evolution lessons has been suggested as a form 
of relief from exclusive presentation of evolution theory.178 
Teaching the theory of evolution, however, presents no estab-
lishment violation, 179 and elimination is not available for free ex-
ercise relief. 18° Consequently, courts could not provide this relief. 
Legislatures would not be so constrained, but such affirmative 
relief for creationists without a judicial finding of an establish-
ment violation necessarily renders the action suspect. If the 
course elimination had the purpose or primary effect of advanc-
ing creationism by ridding the schools of evolutionary discus-
sion, the establishment clause may be violated. 181 
Eliminating instruction in evolution - even if neither religion 
clause is thereby violated - still might offend other constitu-
tional provisions. Although legislatures and school boards may 
control course content182 and remove most secular material, 183 
175. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963). 
176. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. 
177. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968)("The state has no legitimate 
interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them."); cf. Choper, 
supra note 26, at 349 (When the state's program is held to be secular, "dissenters cannot 
require the state to abandon it [for that] would indeed be minority oppression of the 
majority."). 
178. Note, supra note 9, at 565-70. 
179. See supra notes 26-86 and accompanying text. 
180. See infra note 196. 
181. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103, 109 (1963)(the state may not "blot 
out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with" a religious doctrine; anti-
evolution statute constituted an establishment of religion because evolution was banned 
"for the sole reason that it [was] deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine"). 
182. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. at 111 ("It would be difficult to make a First Amendment case out of a state law 
eliminating the subject of higher mathematics, or astronomy, or biology from its curricu-
lum.")(Black, J., concurring). The Epperson majority suggested that the elimination 
statute might have been allowed had it proscribed "all discussion of the origin of man." 
Id. at 109; see also Zykan v. W8.fli8W Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th 
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they cannot ban "an entire system of respected human 
thought"18" merely because its ideas are controversial.1811 This 
would undermine the purpose of freedom of speech in a pluralis-
tic society. Moreover, sweeping state restrictions on what can be 
taught in public schools would violate teachers' first amendment 
rights to academic freedom186 as well as students' rights to re-
ceive information. 187 
Were the theory of evolution merely ancillary to science, its 
elimination would not cause great concern. But the theory of 
evolution is central to the explanation of biology, geology, and 
astronomy. The resultant chilling effect on science and scientific 
research is reason enough to disallow this remedy.188 For stu-
dents, especially students wishing to pursue a scientific or medi-
cal profession, to miss these courses of study would be a severe 
handicap. 
Cir. 1980); Arunda v. Dekalb County School Dist., 620 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1980). See 
generally supra note 22. 
183. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
184. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
185. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)("[A]bove all else, the 
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). This strong presumption 
against content-based speech regulations is apparently not conclusive; but the Court's 
exceptions are not applicable to the present discussion. See Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)(allowing regu-
lation of protected speech that was sexually explicit or patently offensive). 
186. Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1969)(academic freedom, espe-
cially for university professors, is a special concern of the first amendment); Healy v. 
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)(academic freedom precludes university administration from 
barring student groups' campus recognition). But see Zykan v. Warsaw Community 
School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980)(academic freedom in secondary schools, 
though recognized, is limited by the intellectual skills of students and the great state 
interest controlling education); Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 
1979)(secondary school teachers have no absolute right to teach as they please), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 626 (1980). See generally Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 232-41 (discussing 
the rights of students and teachers under the broad penumbra of "academic due 
process"). 
187. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)("1t is now well established that 
the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."); accord Virginia 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 
(1976). While the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized a secondary student's first 
amendment "right to receive information," lower courts have. See Minarcini v. Strongs-
ville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 
F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 
454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). 
188. See Robertson, The Scientist;s Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1204, 1248-53 (1978)(explaining the constitutional grounds for a 
"right to research"). But cf. Goldberg, supra note 26, at 11-16 (speech and press "clauses 
protect scientific communication and expression, not the performance of experiments"). 
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C. Curriculum Modification 
459 
Although balanced treatment and elimination are improper 
free exercise remedies, several permissible remedies remain. One 
is to avoid dogmatic presentations of evolution. Another is to 
allow creation to be presented, not as a scientifically valid alter-
native, but as one of the many creation stories of the world's 
religions. 
1. "Undogmatizing" the evolution lesson- Lessons which 
imply that evolution is an accepted fact, or "the final word," do 
a grave disservice to the student. Natural science education 
must train the child to think critically about present scientific 
theories.189 Consequently, those textbooks which represent the 
theory of evolution dogmatically may warrant some modification 
to reflect the theory's inherent uncertainty.190 Admittedly, the 
more technical weaknesses of evolutionary theory will be lost on 
younger children. Nevertheless, elementary texts could empha-
size that no scientific theory - not even evolution - should be 
blindly accepted. 
2. Comparative religion courses- Despite its religious under-
pinnings, the subject of scientific creationism need not be ban-
ished altogether. 191 The Constitution does not prohibit instruc-
tion in the world's religions, provided such instruction is 
conducted in a secular and neutral fashion. 192 While the school 
cannot favor or disfavor any particular religion, it may analyze 
objectively the various religions of the world. Accordingly, bibli-
cal and scientific creationism, though inappropriate in the sci-
ence classroom, are proper subjects for a comparative religion 
course. The course could cover religious views of the universe's 
origin, presenting not only Genesis, but the creation accounts of 
other religions as well. 193 This presentation would help allay the 
189. See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 66, at 392. 
190. Presenting the theory of evolution too equivocally would, of course, undermine 
its presentation. Moreover, changes made solely for religious accommodations may vio-
late the establishment clause. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1968). Never-
theless, certain modificiations may be useful, though some evolutionary scientists fear 
that "modification" means "undermining." See Creation Compromised, Sci. AM., Feb. 
1973, at 47; see also Letters, Creationism and Evolution, 179 SCIENCE 953, 953-56 (1973). 
See generally Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 211 nn.6-7. 
191. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963)(Goldberg, J., concur-
ring)(the establishment clause does not forbid teaching about religion); id. at 225 (opin-
ion of the Court)(schools may use the Bible in literature or history classes if neutrally 
presented); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 398 U.S. 97, 106 (1963). 
192. See supra note 132. 
193. There are many creation accounts believed throughout the world, each deserving 
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fears of creationist parents and ameliorate the free exercise bur-
den felt by many creationist students. Exposure to biblical and 
scientific creationism in a comparative religion class, combined 
with the creationist child's training in church and at home, 
should eliminate whatever threat instruction of evolutionary 
theory poses to the religious free exercise of all but "strict" 
creationists. 
D. Exemption 
Individual exemption or excusal from evolution lessons is the 
best form of relief where the instruction burdens only a f ew194 
and the state interest is not sufficient to justify the burden. In 
this way the state is allowed, for the most part, to pursue its 
desired ends. 1911 In the last thirty years, exemption has been the 
exclusive remedy awarded in cases based solely on free exercise 
complaints.196 
commensurate treatment should the school choose to present one. Of course, many 
school districts and states will oppose such a plan, realizing that mere exposure to di-
verse religions in the setting of the public classroom may lead to indoctrination. See, e.g., 
Recent Developments, supra note 132, at 195. 
194. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(only 93 children in the school 
district potentially burdened); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(only two bur-
dened complainants in the area); Note, supra note 9, at 549 nn.165-66. 
195. Exempting the Amish from attending secondary school left the state free to con-
tinue teaching non-Amish children without change. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972). More extensive relief for the free exercise claim might have been unduly disrup-
tive, frustrating the state's educational goals. See Note, supra note 9, at 545. For a gen-
eral analysis of the exemption remedy, see Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free 
Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 352-65 (1980). 
196. See Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div. 450 U.S. 707 (1981)(ex-
empting Jehovah's Witness from obligation to manufacture war materiel); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(exempting Amish children from post-eighth grade education); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(exempting Seventh-day Adventist from Satur-
day work requirement); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)(not allowing verity 
of religious doctrines to be explored in fraud prosecution); Follett v. Town of McCor-
mick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944)(exempting religious sales from tax); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940)(exempting sales of religious literature from licensure requirements). 
Two other cases provided statutory exemptions: Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 
(1970) and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1963). See Note, supra note 9, at 549. 
Commentators have claimed that elimination of the violati~e program is available as 
free exercise relief. See, e.g., id. at 549-50; Note, supra note 195, at 350 n.l. Admittedly, 
a number of Supreme Court cases have granted elimination as a remedy while purport-
ing to protect free exercise rights. Careful analysis reveals, however, that in each of these 
cases free exercise was an alternative holding - either an establishment violation or 
some other first amendment abridgement was present to trigger elimination. In McDan-
iel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), Tennessee had disqualified clergymen as legislators. The 
Supreme Court's plurality opinion, though focusing on free exercise, mentioned neutral-
ity. The concurring opinion extended this point and correctly noted that this "patent 
hostility" toward clerics had a primary effect which inhibited religion, thereby violating 
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Where free exercise complaints are anticipated, some accom-
modating legislation may be appropriate. For instance, statutory 
exemption has been authorized where the religious burden is im-
posed by other statutory provisions. 197 Exemptions prompted by 
religious motives, however, may exempt individuals from oner-
ous state obligations, or conversely, cause a substantial denial of 
state benefits, thus violating the establishment clause's neutral-
ity command. 198 
Exemption obviously is not a perfect remedy.199 A student ex-
empt from a lesson foregoes an educational experience shared by 
peers. In addition, the mere act of asking for an exemption can 
the establishment clause. Id. at 636 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 
319 (1972)(per curiam), a state prison barred Buddhists, but not other religions, from 
religious practices. The Court held that Texas had "violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments," including the free exercise clause. Id. at 322. But discrimination between 
religions is an establishment violation. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 
(1947). In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the state required public officers to 
recite a religious oath. While a free exercise claim would have been easily sustained, the 
Court chose instead to consider the oath an aid to religion, and relied heavily on estab-
lishment cases in its analysis. Id. at 492-95. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 
U.S. 94 (1951), a state statute authorized official recognition of a church faction. While 
this may have burdened the free exercise of the nonrecognized faction, it also aided a 
religion and entangled the state in ecclesiastical disputes, both prohibited by the estab-
lishment clause. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court struck 
down a law which disallowed private and parochial schools. The decision could not rely 
on free exercise grounds because the free exercise clause had not yet been extended to 
the states. Id. at 535. If decided today, the free exercise clause might be an alternative 
holding; but the purpose and primary effect of inhibiting all religious schools would un-
doubtedly invoke the establishment clause and therefore trigger elimination. 
Other elimination cases which ostensibly turned on free exercise issues expressly 
presented alternative first amendment grounds. E.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 
(1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)(state discrimination against Jeho-
vah's Witnesses violates the first amendment; no explicit clause cited but free speech and 
establishment violation readily apparent in addition to the free exercise problem); Kunz 
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951)(prohibition of public worship on city streets without 
permit violated free exercise and free speech); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); 
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)(prohibition of religious literature distri-
bution violated free exercise and free press); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943)(reli-
gious literature license violated free exercise and free press). 
197. See, e.g., N.Y. Enuc. LAW § 3204(5) (McKinney 1970)(Christian Science stu-
dents may be excused when the germ theory of disease is taught); TEx. Enuc. ConE ANN. 
§ 21.104 (Vernon 1972)(exemption allowed from physiology and hygiene course if in-
struction conflicts with the religious teachings of a "well established church" to which 
child belongs); WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 28A.05.030 (West 1970)(excusal from physical 
education classes for "religious belier'). See generally Hirschoff, supra note I, at 893. 
198. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 393, 409 (1963); see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961)(to ex-
empt Saturday worshippers from Sunday-closing law might discriminate against Sunday 
worshippers). 
199. See Note, supra note 9, at 543-70 (exemption is inadequate in face of wide-
spread abridgement of free exercise, though elimination may be too drastic a solution in 
some cases). 
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be stigmatizing, though such singling out is an unavoidable part 
of the experience of nonconformists in our culture.200 Neverthe-
less, the most appropriate form of relief for the "strict" creation-
ist student is exemption from the evolution classes.201 This rem-
edy satisfies the state interest in teaching the natural science 
course and does not deny non-creationist children exposure to 
the important concepts of evolution theory.202 Moreover, the 
"strict" creationist student suffers no unfair denial of state ben-
efits, having expressed no interest in receiving the benefit.203 
CONCLUSION 
The contemporary debate bet~een creationists and supporters 
of the theory of evolution raises many difficult issues, often ob-
scured by the invariably strong emotions engendered by the con-
troversy. At a fundamental level, parents question how their 
children can be reared in a religious environment when they 
must attend public schools. The evolution controversy provides 
a battleground for this debate, but unfortunately the rhetoric 
obscures the facts. 
This Note discusses the state's power to control its schools' 
curricula, and how the first amendment religion clauses restrict 
that control. It applies the religion clauses to the teaching of the 
theory of evolution and finds no violation of the establishment 
clause. With respect to certain "strict" creationists, however, ex-
posure to evolutionary theory may constitute an unconstitu-
tional burden on the free exercise of religious beliefs. The pro-
posed solution of balanced treatment with scientific creationism 
200. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 233 (1948)(the Constitution does 
not protect one from the "embarrassment that always attends non-conformity, whether 
in religion, politics, behavior or dress"); Ashman, The Holy Bible in the Public Schools, 
40 CORNELL L.Q. 475, 495 (1955)("part of the price of being a religious nonconformist is 
the social stigma which all non-conformists have to bear"). 
201. Only "strict" separatists need be exempted, and they represent "only a small 
minority of separatists." Note, supra note 9, at 564 n.239; see supra note 109 and accom-
panying text. The legislature could, of course, extend this relief more broadly if it de-
sired, so long as the intent was religious neutrality and not overeager accommodation. 
202. See Note, supra note 9, at 545. 
203. Creationist students would miss merely 10% of biology class. See supra note 
102. This is hardly a denial of a state benefit similar to the state compensation in 
Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Moreover, creationist students do not want the "benefit" 
they are being allowed to miss - evolution lessons. See Note, supra note 9, at 530 n.72 
("[w]here an individual does not want a public benefit" there is no coercion against free 
exercise). 
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violates the establishment clause, however, and elimination ·of 
evolution lessons altogether would be equally impermissible. 
Consequently, exemption of the "strict" creationist student from 
classes involving evolution along with minor curriculum modifi-
cation provides appropriate relief. 
-J. Greg Whitehair 

